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Abstract
In this PhD thesis, several concepts of distinct areas of Mathematics, such as
Dynamical Systems, Game Theory and Statistics are applied to Economical
and Biomedical Sciences. The Patent Licensing is studied in a Cournot
competition framework, the General Equilibrium Theory is approached in
terms of Edgeworthian economies and the subject of Immunology is covered
through models with Regulatory T cells.
Cournot competition Models: We consider a Cournot competition
model with a cost reducing R&D investment program. A new R&D cost re-
duction investment function inspired by the logistic equation is introduced.
We compare the results obtained using our cost reduction investment fun-
ction with the ones obtained using d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin’s cost
reduction investment function. We study the underlying model and ﬁnd
the existence of diﬀerent Nash investment regions: a competitive Nash in-
vestment region, a single Nash investment region and a nil Nash investment
region. Moreover, we ﬁnd regions with multiple Nash investment equilibria.
We present an exhaustive characterization of the boundaries of the diﬀe-
rent economical regions that are found. For low production costs, that can
correspond to the production of old technologies, the long term economi-
vi
cal eﬀects are not very sensitive to small changes in the eﬃciency of the
R&D programs neither to small changes in the market structure. However,
for high production costs, that can correspond to the production of new
technologies, the long term economical eﬀects are very sensitive to small
changes in the eﬃciency of the R&D programs and also to small changes in
the market structure.
Edgeworthian economies Models: General equilibrium theory as-
sumes an interaction between the participants that is both global and anony-
mous. The studied models, random matching games, introduce mechanisms
of direct exchange in an Edgeworth exchange economy where two goods are
traded in a market place. We prove, under the appropriate assumptions,
that the expected value of the logarithm of the limiting bilateral Walras
equilibrium price is equal to the logarithm of the global Walras equilibrium
price. We also consider a modiﬁcation to this model in which participants
have diﬀerent bargaining skills meaning that participants do not necessa-
rily trade according to their bilateral Walras equilibrium price. The trade
occurs such that the more skilled bargainer takes advantage of his edge
when exchanging with a less skilled bargainer. When the market has a
group of low skilled bargainers and a group of high skilled bargainers, the
smaller of these two groups shows a higher median increase on the value
of the utilities of the participants. Finally, we let the bargaining skills of
the participants be a continuous variable that evolves along the iterations
according to one of the following rules: a) the bargaining skills of the pair of
participants decrease if they were able to trade and increases otherwise; b)
the bargaining skills of the pair of participants increases if they were able to
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trade and decreases otherwise. We observe that for rule a) the bargaining
skills of each participant converge to one of two possible extreme values,
and that for rule b) the bargaining skills of all participants converge to a
single intermediate bargaining skill value.
Immune response Models: The consequences of regulatory T cell
(Treg) inhibition of interleukine 2 secretion are examined by mathematical
modeling. We determine the analytic formula that describes the ﬁne ba-
lance between Regulatory T cells and T cells at controlled and immune res-
ponse equilibrium states. We demonstrate that cytokine dependent growth
exhibits a quorum T cell population threshold that determines if immune
responses develop on activation. We also determine the analytic formulas
of T cell proliferation thresholds that allow the study of the sensibility of
the quorum growth thresholds controlling immune responses. We introduce
an asymmetry reﬂecting that the diﬀerence between the growth and death
rates can be higher for the active T cells and Tregs than for the inactive.
This asymmetry can be due to the existence of memory T cells and explains
why slow increases of the antigenic stimuli do not lead to an immune res-
ponse, but fast increases provoke an immune response. Finally, we study the
bystander proliferation in the immune response model with the asymmetry.
An exposure to a pathogen results in an increased proliferation rate of the
bystander T cells. If the population of the bystander T cells becomes large
enough, autoimmunity can arise, eventually after a long transient period.

Resumo
Nesta Tese de Doutoramento diversos conceitos de a´reas distintas da Matema´tica
tais como Sistemas Dinaˆmicos, Teoria de Jogos e Estat´ıstica sa˜o aplicados
a Cieˆncias Econo´micas e Biome´dicas. O Licenciamento de Patentes e´ estu-
dado atrave´s de modelos de competic¸a˜o de Cournot, a Teoria do Equil´ıbrio
Geral e´ abordada atrave´s de modelos de economias de Edgeworth e na
Imunologia sa˜o estudados modelos de ce´lulas T reguladoras.
Modelos de Competic¸a˜o de Cournot Consideramos um modelo de
competic¸a˜o de Cournot com programas de investigac¸a˜o e desenvolvimento
(ID) na reduc¸a˜o de custo. E´ introduzida uma nova func¸a˜o de reduc¸a˜o de
custo inspirada na func¸a˜o log´ıstica. Comparamos os resultados obtidos
usando a nossa func¸a˜o de investimento na reduc¸a˜o de custo com a func¸a˜o de
investimento na reduc¸a˜o de custo de d’Aspremont e Jacquemin. Estudamos
o modelo correspondente e encontramos a existeˆncia de diferentes regio˜es de
investimento: uma regia˜o de investimento competitiva, uma regia˜o de in-
vestimento singular e uma regia˜o de investimento nulo. Encontramos ainda
uma regia˜o com mu´ltiplos equilibrios de Nash no investimento. Para custos
de produc¸a˜o baixos, que podem corresponder a tecnologias antigas, os efeitos
econo´micos a longo prazo na˜o sa˜o muito sens´ıveis a pequenas alterac¸o˜es na
xeﬁcieˆncia do programa de investigac¸a˜o e desenvolvimento. Contudo, para
custos de produc¸a˜o altos, que podem corresponder a tecnologias mais re-
centes, os efeitos econo´micos a longo prazo sa˜o muito sens´ıveis a pequenas
alterac¸o˜es na eﬁcieˆncia do programa de investigac¸a˜o e desenvolvimento.
Modelos de economias Edgeworthianas A Teoria do Equil´ıbrio
Geral assume uma interacc¸a˜o entre os participantes que e´ global e ano´nima.
Os modelos estudados, modelos de encontros de trocas aleato´rias, intro-
duzem mecanismos de troca directa numa economia de Egdeworth onde
dois bens sa˜o trocados num mercado. Provamos que, sob as hipo´teses apro-
priadas, o valor esperado do logaritmo do prec¸o de equil´ıbrio de Walras li-
mite e´ igual ao logaritmo do prec¸o de equil´ıbrio de Walras global. Tambe´m
consideramos uma modiﬁcac¸a˜o deste modelo no qual os participantes teˆm
diferentes capacidades de negociac¸a˜o (aptida˜o) signiﬁcando que eles nem
sempre negoceiam de acordo com o equil´ıbrio de Walras bilateral. As tro-
cas ocorrem de modo a que o jogador mais apto tenha vantagem quando a
negociar com um jogador menos apto. Quando o mercado tem um grupo
de participantes pouco aptos e outro grupo de participantes mais aptos, o
mais pequeno dos dois grupos, evidencia um maior aumento na mediana
para o valor das utilidades dos participantes. Finalmente, assumimos que
a capacidade de negociac¸a˜o dos participantes e´ uma varia´vel cont´ınua que
evolui ao longo das iterac¸o˜es de acordo com uma das seguintes regras: a)
as capacidades de negociac¸a˜o do par de participantes decrescem se esse par
conseguiu negociar e crescem caso contra´rio; b) as capacidades de nego-
ciac¸a˜o do par de participantes aumentam se esse par conseguiu trocar e
decrescem caso contra´rio. No caso da regra a) as capacidade de negociac¸a˜o
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dos dois participantes convergem para um de dois valores poss´ıveis enquanto
que no caso da regra b) as capacidade de negociac¸a˜o dos dois participantes
convergem para um u´nico valor interme´dio.
Modelos de resposta imunita´ria As consequeˆncias da inibic¸a˜o da
secrec¸a˜o da interleucina 2 pelas ce´lulas T reguladoras (Treg) sa˜o exami-
nadas por modelac¸a˜o matema´tica. Determinamos a fo´rmula que descreve
o balanc¸o ﬁno entre as ce´lulas T reguladoras e as ce´lulas T em equil´ıbrios
correspondentes a estados controlados e de resposta imunita´ria. Demonstra-
mos que a proliferac¸a˜o dependente de citocinas exibe um quo´rum limiar da
populac¸a˜o de ce´lulas T que determina se apo´s activac¸a˜o sera´ desenvolvida
uma resposta imunita´ria. Tambe´m determinamos as fo´rmulas anal´ıticas dos
limiares de proliferac¸a˜o de ce´lulas T que permitem estudar a sensibilidade
dos quo´runs limiares de crescimento que controlam as respostas imunita´rias.
Introduzimos uma assimetria para reﬂectir que a diferenc¸a entre a taxa de
crescimento e de mortalidade pode ser maior para as ce´lulas T e Tregs acti-
vas do que para as inactivas. Esta assimetria pode dever-se a` existeˆncia
de ce´lulas T de memo´ria e explica a raza˜o pela qual aumentos lentos dos
est´ımulos antige´nicos na˜o levam a uma resposta imunita´ria, mas aumen-
tos ra´pidos provocam uma resposta imunita´ria. Finalmente, estudamos a
proliferac¸a˜o de ce´lulas espectadoras no modelo de resposta imunita´ria com
assimetria. A exposic¸a˜o a um patoge´nio resulta num aumento da taxa de
proliferac¸a˜o das ce´lulas T espectadoras. Se a populac¸a˜o destas ce´lulas T
espectadoras se tornar suﬁcientemente grande, pode surgir autoimunidade
eventualmente apo´s um longo per´ıodo transiente.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This PhD Thesis is the result of three diﬀerent research projects I have been
involved in. Diﬀerent areas of knowledge in Mathematics were applied to
Economical and Biomedical Sciences.
In Chapter 2, together with B. Oliveira and A.A. Pinto, we study a
Counot competition model with R&D investments on the reduction of the
production costs. This chapter is mostly based on the research articles [29]
and [30], in the conference proceedings [21], [22], [23], [54], [55], [57] and
[58] and in the book chapters [31] and [59]. In Chapter 3, jointly with B.F.
Finkensta¨dt, B. Oliveira, A.A. Pinto and A.N. Yannacopoulos, we study
random matching Edgeworthian economies. This chapter is mostly based
on the research article [27], in the conference proceedings [24], [25], [26],
[33] and [56] and in the book chapter [28]. In Chapter 4, a problem in
Immunology is studied. This Chapter is joint work with N.J. Burroughs,
B. Oliveira and A.A. Pinto. This Chapter is mostly based on the work
developed in three research articles, namely [13], [14] and [15] and in the
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book chapter [32].
In Chapter 2 we consider a Cournot competition model where two Firms
invest in R&D projects to reduce their production costs. This competition is
modeled, as usual, by a two-stage game (see d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin
[4]). In the ﬁrst subgame, two Firms choose, simultaneously, their R&D in-
vestment strategy to reduce their initial production costs. In the second
subgame, the two Firms are involved in a Cournot competition with produ-
ction costs equal to the reduced cost determined by the R&D cost reduction
investment program. We introduce a new R&D cost reduction investment
function inspired by the logistic equation (see Equation (2.2)) whose proper-
ties are diﬀerent from the ones exhibited by the usual R&D cost reduction
investment function (see Equation (2.3)). The main diﬀerences between our
cost reduction investment function and the standard d’Aspremont and A.
Jacquemin’s cost reduction investment function are: (i) the cost reduction
obtained by the Firms using d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin’s R&D cost
reduction investment function tends to inﬁnity with the investment whereas
the cost reduction obtained by the Firms using our R&D cost reduction in-
vestment function tends to a capacity that is proportional to the diﬀerence
between the current production cost of Firm Fi and the minimum attainable
production cost cL; (ii) the derivative at zero investment using d’Aspremont
and A. Jacquemin’s R&D cost reduction investment function [4] is inﬁnity
whereas using the cost reduction investment function that we propose is
a ﬁnite value. Thus, two diﬀerent cost reduction investment functions are
considered: the standard R&D cost reduction investment function, aAi , in-
troduced in the literature by d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin [4]; and an
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R&D cost reduction investment function, inspired by the logistic equation,
ai, that was introduced by Ferreira et al [29]. We compare both cost redu-
ction investment functions and analyze, in terms of equilibria outcome, both
cases. We will refer to the model where d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin’s
cost reduction investment function is used as AJ-Model and to the model
where our cost reduction investment function is used as the FOP-Model. We
ﬁnd the Perfect Nash equilibra of the Cournot competition model with R&D
cost reduction investment programs two stage-game and study the econo-
mical eﬀects of these distinct Perfect Nash equilibria. The second subgame,
consisting of a Cournot competition, has a unique perfect Nash equilibrium.
For the ﬁrst subgame, consisting of an R&D cost reduction investment pro-
gram, we ﬁnd, for the FOP-Model, four diﬀerent regions of Nash investment
equilibria that we characterize as follows: a competitive Nash investment
region C where both Firms invest, a single Nash investment region S1 for
Firm F1, where only Firm F1 invests, a single Nash investment region S2 for
Firm F2, where only Firm F2 invests, and a nil Nash investment region N ,
where neither of the Firms invest. In the AJ-Model, for the ﬁrst subgame,
we only ﬁnd three diﬀerent Nash investment equilibria regions: the com-
petitive Nash investment region C and the single Nash investment regions
S1 and S2. This diﬀerence in behavior is due to the shape of the R&D cost
reduction investment function considered for this model bringing an higher
incentive to invest reﬂected in the disappearance of the nil Nash investment
region found for the FOP-Model.
For the FOP-Model, the nil Nash investment region N consists of four
nil Nash investment subregions, NLL, NLH , NHL and NHH where neither of
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the Firms invest and so have constant production costs. In the nil Nash in-
vestment region NLL both Firms have low production costs; in the nil Nash
investment region NLH Firm F1 has low production cost and Firm F2 has
high production cost; in the nil Nash investment region NHL Firm F2 has
low production cost and Firm F1 has high production cost; and in the nil
Nash investment region NHH both Firms have high production costs. The
economical reasons for both Firms to choose not to invest in the nil Nash
investment regions NLL, NHL, NLH and NHH are quite diﬀerent. In the
region NLL, neither of the Firms invest because the Firms already have so
low costs that the investment is not recovered by the increase in the proﬁt
associated to the decrease of their production costs. In the region NLH
(respectively NHL), neither of the Firms invest because Firm F1 (respecti-
vely F2) has so low production costs and Firm F2 (respectively F1) has so
high production costs that if one Firm invests and decreases its production
costs, then it is not able to recover its investment with the corresponding
increase in the proﬁt associated to the new production costs. In the region
NHH neither of the Firms invest because the Firms already have so high
production costs that the investment is not recovered by the increase in the
proﬁt associated to the decrease of their production costs. The single Nash
investment region Si can be decomposed into two disjoint regions: a single
favorable Nash investment region SFi where the production costs, after in-
vestment, are favorable to Firm Fi; and a single recovery Nash investment
region SRi where the production costs, after investment are, still, favorable
to Firm Fj but Firm Fi recovers, slightly, from its initial disadvantage. The
economical reasons for Firm Fj deciding not to invest in the single favora-
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ble Nash investment region SFi and in the single recovery Nash investment
region SRi are opposite. In the single favorable Nash investment region S
F
i ,
the production costs of Firm Fj are too high for the Firm Fj to recover its
investment by increasing its proﬁt due to decreasing its production costs.
In the single recovery Nash investment region SRi , the production costs of
Firm Fj are too low for the Firm Fj to be willing to invest to decrease, even
more, its production costs and, so, Firm Fi is able to decrease its production
costs by investing. The single favorable Nash investment region SFi can also
be decomposed into three regions: the single duopoly region SDi , the single
monopoly region SMi and the single monopoly boundary region S
B
i . The
single monopoly region SMi consists of all production costs such that, after
Firm Fi’s investment, the new production costs are in the monopoly region
of Firm Fi. The single monopoly boundary region S
B
i consists of all produ-
ction costs such that, after Firm Fi’s investment, the new production costs
are in the boundary between the monopoly region and the duopoly region
of Firm Fi. The single duopoly region S
D
i consists of all production costs
such that, after the Firm Fi’s investment, the new production costs are still
in the duopoly region of Firm Fi.
The Nash investment equilibria are not necessarily unique leading to an
economical complexity in the choice of the best R&D investment strate-
gies by the Firms. In the AJ-Model, the Nash investment equilibria are
unique (at least when the Firms do not decide to go on a Joint Venture
program together) but, for the FOP-Model, the intersections between the
single Nash investment region S1, the single Nash investment region S2 and
the competitive Nash investment region C are not always empty.
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We also compute the best Nash investment response functions when
the Firms go on a Joint Venture program together and exhibit how the
Nash investment regions change. We note that for the AJ-Model and in
opposition with what was observed in the pure competition case, there are
regions with multiple Nash investment equilibria.
In Section 2.6 we introduce, for the FOP-Model, the R&D determinis-
tic dynamics on the production costs of the Cournot competition, based
on the R&D investment strategies of the Firms, as follows: at every pe-
riod of time, the Firms choose the investment corresponding to one of the
Nash investment equilibria that determines the new production costs of the
Firms. Hence, the implicit equations determining the R&D deterministic
dynamics are distinct in the competitive Nash investment region C and in
the single Nash investment regions S1 and S2. The nil Nash investment
region N determines the set of all production costs that are ﬁxed by the
dynamics. The competitive Nash investment region C determines the re-
gion where the production costs of both Firms evolve along the time. The
single Nash investment region S1 determines the set of production costs
where the production cost of Firm F2 is constant and only the production
cost of Firm F1 evolves. Similarly, the single Nash investment region S2
determines the set of production costs where the production cost of Firm
F1 is constant and only the production cost of Firm F2 evolves. Depending
upon the initial production costs of both Firms and upon their R&D invest-
ment strategies, the nil Nash investment region N is the set of equilibria
for the R&D deterministic dynamics. It is unusual in dynamical systems to
have a non-isolated set of equilibrium points. This is due to the complex
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investment structure that we have to deal in this problem. The nil Nash in-
vestment region N is the union of four disjoint compact sets with non empty
interior NLL, NHL, NLH , NHH . The nil Nash investment regions NLL, NHL
and NLH correspond to their asymptotic production costs. The R&D de-
terministic dynamics in the single Nash investment region S1 = S
F
1 ∪ SR1
are implicitly determined by Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. In the single Nash
investment region S1, only Firm F1 invests along the time. If (c1, c2) belongs
to the single favorable Nash investment region SF1 , then, under the R&D
deterministic dynamics, the production costs approach, along the time, the
region NLH . Hence, the production costs of Firm F1 approach low costs of
production, but the production costs of Firm F2 are always ﬁxed at high
values. Furthermore, at some period of time, the pair of new production
costs can fall in the monopoly region and, so, Firm F2 can be driven out
of the market by Firm F1. If (c1, c2) belongs to the single recovery Nash
investment region SR1 then the production costs approach, under the R&D
deterministic dynamics, the region NLL. Hence, Firm F1 is able to recover,
along the time, from its disadvantage approaching the region where both
Firms have low production costs NLL. In the competitive Nash investment
region C both Firms invest and their new production costs, under the R&D
deterministic dynamics, belong to the duopoly region D. The R&D deter-
ministic dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region C lead both
Firms, along the time, to approach the nil Nash investment region NLL
corresponding to both Firms having low production costs. As described
above, the economical eﬀects observed are quite distinct depending upon
the initial production costs of both Firms belonging to the single recovery
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Nash investment region SRi , single favorable Nash investment region S
F
i ,
and competitive Nash investment region C. For high production costs, that
can correspond to the production of new technologies, there are subregions
of production costs where there are multiple Nash investment equilibria.
Hence, the production costs evolve, along the time, to the distinct eco-
nomic regions NHL, NLH and NLL. In the region RS1∩S2 , where there are,
simultaneously, two single Nash investment equilibria, if one Firm decides
to invest in the ﬁrst period, then the Firm that invests drives the other Firm
out of the Market, and its production costs will decrease, along the time, to
low production costs. Hence, the short and long term economical outcome
for both Firms depends only upon the R&D investment decision of both
Firms at period one. This shows the high relevance of the Firms rapidly
implementing their R&D cost reduction investment programs in the case
of high initial production costs. In the region RS1∩C (respectively RS2∩C) if
both Firms decide to implement their R&D cost reduction investment pro-
grams according to the Nash investment strategy in region C both Firms
will stay in the market and their production costs will approach, along the
time, low production costs. However, if one of the Firms decides not to in-
vest in period one, this Firm is driven out of the Market and the production
costs of the other Firm will approach, along the time, low production costs
in the region NLH (respectively NHL). For further information on R&D
cost reduction investment programs in Cournot competitions see the works
of Amir et al[2], Kamien et al[39].
The problem of providing strategic foundations of general equilibrium
theory, has been a long standing problem of crucial importance in economic
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theory. The main objective of this strand of thought is to provide a market
game, realistic enough to describe the behavior of agents in real market
situations, such that the equilibrium of this game approaches under certain
conditions the competitive equilibrium for the same market. A particularly
fruitful and popular way of pursuing this line of research is through the use
of dynamic matching games, in which agents meet randomly, and exchange
rationally, according to local rules. Such attempts started with the seminal
work Mathematical Pshycics of Francis Ysidro Edgeworth in 1881, [20], and
were further advanced by a number of researchers, including Shubik [71],
Aumann and Shapley [5],[6], Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [1], Mas
Colell [47] etc. More speciﬁcally, the approach through random matching
games was promoted by researchers such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky [66],
Binmore and Herrero [7], Gale [36] and references therein, McLennan and
Schonnenschein [49] etc. In Chapter 3 this problem is approached and we
wish to contribute to this literature, by studying conditions under which
the equilibrium of a market game, deﬁned by a random matching game,
approaches the equilibrium of a fully competitive Walrasian model. We
study models of Edgeworthian exchange economies, without production nor
consumption of the two goods traded in the market place. The random
matching game, consists of agents, paired at random, who exchange goods
at the bilateral Walras equilibrium price, which is the price at the core, such
that the market locally clears. The choice for this scenario, is inspired by
the work of Binmore and Herrero [7]. Under some symmetry conditions,
on the initial endowments and the agents preferences, it is showed that for
the special case of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the expectation of the
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logarithm of the equilibrium price, obtained as a limit for the repeated game
as the number of trades tends to inﬁnity, is equal to the expectation of the
logarithm of the Walrasian equilibrium price. We also consider a modiﬁ-
cation to the model, where we associate to each participant either a low
or high bargaining skill factor which brings up a game alike the prisoner’s
dilemma into the usual Edgeworthian exchange economy. In this model,
the participants trade at a price diﬀerent from the bilateral Walras equi-
librium price, with advantage to the more skilled bargainer. However, if
both participants are highly skilled bargainers, they will not be allowed to
trade, as a penalization. If the pair elected to trade is formed by two low
skilled bargainers, they will trade according to the usual bilateral Walras
equilibrium price. For this modiﬁed model we consider that the market has
a group of low skilled bargainers and a group of high skilled bargainers, with
diﬀerent sizes. We study, in this market, the variations on the utility values
of the participants. Our observations indicate that the group with higher
median increase in the utilities is the one in minority, meaning that is better
to be in minority. Finally, we let the bargaining skills of the participants
be a continuous variable that evolves, along the trades, according to one
of the following rules: a) the bargaining skills of the participants decrease
if they were able to trade and increases otherwise; b) the bargaining skills
of the participants increases if they were able to trade and decreases other-
wise. We observe that for rule a) the bargaining skills of the participants
approach either a high bargaining skill or a low bargaining skill, and that for
rule b) the bargaining skills of all participants converge to an intermediate
bargaining skill.
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The primary function of the immune system is the protection of the
host from pathogen invasion. During such an invasion, T cells speciﬁc to
the antigen proliferate and under most circumstances successfully remove
the pathogen. However, the immune system can also target self antigens
(autoimmunity) and cause tissue damage and death. Regulatory T cells, or
Tregs, have emerged as a fundamental component of the T cell repertoire,
being generated in the thymus under positive selection by self peptides [38].
The Treg repertoire is as diverse as conventional T cells [38] and perform
vital immune suppressive functions. Removal of Tregs, eg by (cell sorted)
adoptive transfer experiments cause a variety of autoimmune disorders in
rodents, whilst many autoimmune diseases can be associated with a mis-
regulation of Tregs, eg IPEX [68]. Under exposure to their speciﬁc antigen,
conventional T cells are activated leading to secretion of growth cytokines
(predominantly interleukine 2, denoted IL2), and expression of the inter-
leukine 2 receptor which triggers cytokine driven proliferation. However,
in the presence of active Tregs the growth of conventional T cells is in-
hibited. Part of this growth inhibition is the inhibition of IL2 secretion by
T cells [74, 69]. Signiﬁcantly, addition of IL2 abrogates inhibition, whilst IL2
appears to be a key intermediary of the dynamics between Tregs and con-
ventional T cells [35, 65, 76]. The process of Treg signalling to conventional
T cells is still a matter of debate, evidence exists for both cell:cell mediated
inhibition and soluble mediators such as TNFβ and IL10 [68]. It is likely
that multiple methods of regulation are involved. Further, most studies indi-
cate that regulation is not T cell speciﬁc, i.e. Tregs inhibit all conventional
T cells independent of their antigen speciﬁcity [75], although a diﬀerent
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report suggests the contrary [73]. Tregs clearly function to limit such au-
toimmune responses with a delicate balance between appropriate immune
activation and immune response suppression being achieved. How such a
balance is established and controlled is the central focus of the papers [11],
[13]. The motivation is the observation that T cell proliferation through cy-
tokines already has such a control structure; cytokine driven growth exhibits
a quorum population size threshold [18]. In [11] it is proposed that Tregs
locally adjust these thresholds by inhibiting IL2 secretion. The immune
response-suppression axis is then a balance between the local numbers of
activated T cells (eg from a pathogen encounter) and activated Tregs. This
balance can be altered by cross reactivity [11] or through bystander pro-
liferation [15]. In Subsection 4.1.1 we present an immune response model
as a set of six ordinary diﬀerential equations. The analysis of the model is
discussed in Section 4.2, where is shown that this model has a bistability
region bounded by two thresholds of antigenic stimulation of T cells and
we discuss the immune responses when there is cross reactivity between a
pathogen and a self antigen. An asymmetry in the immune response model
is presented in Section 4.3. This asymmetry takes into account that T cells
in diﬀerent states have distinct death rates. We observe that this model has
a better behavior than the model with symmetric death rates in the simula-
tions of a bystander immune response. The model with the asymmetry has
a transcritic bifurcation for some tuning between the antigenic stimulation
of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of Tregs. Thus, the rate of increase
of antigenic stimulation of T cells may determine, for parameter values near
the transcritic bifurcation, if an immune response arises or not.
Chapter 2
Cournot competition Models
2.1 Introduction
The work presented in this Chapter is joint work with B. Oliveira and A.A.
Pinto and most of it is contained in the research articles [29] and [30], in
the conference proceedings [21], [22], [23], [54], [55], [57] and [58] and in the
book chapters [31] and [59].
We present a new R&D cost reduction investment function in a Cournot
competition model inspired by the logistic equation. We do a full characteri-
zation of the associated game and study the short and long term economical
eﬀects derived from using this new R&D cost reduction investment function.
In particular, we ﬁnd the existence of regions with multiple Nash investment
equilibria. We present an exhaustive characterization of the boundaries of
the diﬀerent economical regions that are found. For low production costs,
that can correspond to the production of old technologies, the long term
economical eﬀects are not very sensitive to small changes in the eﬃciency of
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the R&D programs neither to small changes in the market structure. How-
ever, for high production costs, that can correspond to the production of
new technologies, the long term economical eﬀects are very sensitive to small
changes in the eﬃciency of the R&D programs and also to small changes
in the market structure. We compare the results obtained for the model
using our cost reduction investment function with the ones obtained using
d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin’s cost reduction investment function.
2.2 R&D investments on costs
The Cournot competition with R&D cost reduction investment programs
consists of two subgames in one period of time. The ﬁrst subgame is an
R&D cost reduction investment program, where both Firms have initial
production costs and choose, simultaneously, their R&D investment strate-
gies to obtain new production costs. The second subgame is a Cournot
competition with production costs equal to the reduced cost determined
by the R&D cost reduction investment function. As it is well known, the
second subgame has a unique perfect Nash equilibrium. For the ﬁrst sub-
game two diﬀerent cost reduction investment functions are considered: the
standard R&D cost reduction function, aAi , introduced in the literature by
d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin [4]; and an R&D cost reduction invest-
ment function, inspired by the logistic equation, ai, that was introduced by
Ferreira et al [29]. Throughout this Section we will describe and compare
both cost reduction investment functions and analyze, in terms of equilibria
outcome, both cases. We will refer to the model where d’Aspremont and A.
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Jacquemin’s cost reduction investment function is used as AJ-Model and
to the model where our cost reduction investment function is used as the
FOP-Model.
2.2.1 The R&D cost reduction investment programs
Let us consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two Firms, F1
and F2, each one producing a diﬀerentiated good. Following Singh and Vives
[72], we assume that the representative consumer preferences are described
by the following utility function
U(q1, q2) = α1q1 + α2q2 −
(
β1q
2
1 + 2γq1q2 + β2q
2
2
)
/2, (2.1)
where qi is the quantity produced by the Firm Fi, and αi, βi > 0. The
inverse demands are linear and, letting pi be the price of the good produced
by the Firm Fi, they are given, in the region of quantity space where prices
are positive, by
pi = αi − βiqi − γqj.
The goods can be substitutes γ > 0, independent γ = 0, or complements
γ < 0.
Demand for good i is always downward sloping in its own price and in-
creases (decreases) the price of the competitor, if the goods are substitutes
(complements). The ratio γ2/β2i expresses the degree of product diﬀerenti-
ation ranging from zero, when the goods are independent, to one, when the
goods are perfect substitutes. When γ > 0 and γ2/β2i approaches one, we
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are close to a homogeneous market. We consider two diﬀerent cost redu-
ction investment functions: ai, inspired by the logistic equation, that was
introduced by Ferreira et al [29] and is used in the FOP-Model; and aAi that
was introduced by d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin [4] and is used in the
AJ-Model.
In the FOP-Model, the Firm Fi invests an amount vi in an R&D cost
reduction investment program ai : R
+
0 → [bi, ci] that reduces its production
cost to
ai(vi) = ci − 	i(ci − cL)(vi + θivj)
λi + vi + θivj
. (2.2)
where (i) the parameter θi is the spillover parameter determining how the
investment vj made by Firm Fj aﬀects Firm Fi’s new production cost (bigger
θi, means bigger advantage taken by Firm Fi from Firm Fj’s investment on
R&D); (ii) the parameter ci is the unitary production cost of Firm Fi at
the beginning of the period satisfying cL ≤ ci ≤ αi; (iii) the parameter cL is
the minimum attainable production cost; (iv) the parameter 0 < 	i < 1 as
the following meaning: since bi = ai(+∞) = ci − 	i(ci − cL), the maximum
reduction Δi = 	i(ci−cL) of the production cost is a percentage 0 < 	i < 1 of
the diﬀerence between the current cost ci and the lowest possible production
cost cL; (v) the parameter λi > 0 can be seen as a measure of the inverse
of the quality of the R&D cost reduction investment program for Firm Fi,
because a smaller λi will result in a bigger reduction of the production
costs for the same investment. Note that, in particular, when there are no
spillovers, i.e. θ1 = θ2 = 0, ci − ai(λi) gives half Δi/2 of the maximum
possible reduction Δi of the production cost for Firm Fi (see Figure 2.1).
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Let us deﬁne, for simplicity of notation, ηi = 	i(ci − cL).
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Figure 2.1: New production costs as a function of the investment (when
θ1 = θ2 = 0). (A) The maximum reduction in the production costs is Δi,
obtained for an inﬁnite investment vi = +∞. (B) (zoom of the left part of
(A)) When the investment is vi = λi the reduction in the production costs
is Δi/2. (C) Figure (A) with both axes in the Logarithmic scale.
In the AJ-Model, a diﬀerent R&D cost reduction investment function is
used (see [4] for more details), aAi : [0, (λici/ηi)
2]→ [0, ci], given by
aAi (vi) = ci −
	i(ci − cL)
λi
√
vi + θivj, (2.3)
with 	i, λi > 0. The main diﬀerences between both R&D cost reduction
investment programs are in the shape of the underlying cost reduction
investment functions (see Figure 2.2) determining that (when there are
no spillovers θi = θj = 0): (a) the derivative at zero investment using
d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin’s R&D cost reduction investment program
[4] is inﬁnity whereas using ours is a ﬁnite value, i.e.
∂aAi /∂vi =∞ and ∂ai/∂vi =∞
(b) the cost reduction obtained by the Firms using d’Aspremont and A.
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Jacquemin’s R&D cost reduction investment program tends to inﬁnity with
the investment whereas the cost reduction obtained by the Firms using
our R&D cost reduction investment program tends to a capacity that is
proportional to the diﬀerence between the current production cost of Firm
Fi and the minimum attainable production cost cL i.e.
lim
vi→∞
aAi = ci −∞ and lim
vi→∞
ai = ci − ηi = ci − 	(ci − cL)
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Figure 2.2: (A) R&D cost reduction investment functions: FOP-Model cost
reduction investment function, ai, green line, and AJ-Model cost reduction
investment function, aAi , black line; (B) Figure (A) with both axes in the
Logarithmic scale.
2.2.2 Optimal output levels
The proﬁt πi(qi, qj) of Firm Fi is given by
πi(qi, qj) = qi (αi − βiqi − γqj − ai)− vi, (2.4)
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for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j.
The Nash equilibrium output (q∗1, q
∗
2) is given by
q∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if Ri ≤ 0
Ri, if 0 < Ri <
αj−aj
γ
αi−ai
2βi
, if Ri ≥ αj−ajγ
, (2.5)
where
Ri =
2βjαi − γαj − 2βjai + γaj
4βiβj − γ2 ,
with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j. Hence if Ri ≤ 0, the Firm Fj is at monopoly
output level and, conversely, if Ri ≥ (αj−aj)/γ the Firm Fi is at monopoly
output level and for intermediate values, 0 < Ri < (αj − aj)/γ, both Firms
have positive optimal output levels and so we are in the presence of duopoly
competition. From now on, we assume that both Firms choose their Nash
equilibrium outputs (q∗1, q
∗
2). Thus, Firm Fi has proﬁt π
∗
i (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) given by
π∗i (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−vi, if Ri ≤ 0
βiR
2
i − vi, if 0 < Ri < αj−ajγ
(αi−ai)2
4βi
− vi, if Ri ≥ αj−ajγ
. (2.6)
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2.2.3 New Production costs
The sets of possible new production costs for Firms F1 and F2, given initial
production costs c1 and c2, are Ai for the FOP-Model and A
A
i for the AJ-
Model. These sets are given, respectively, by
Ai = Ai(c1, c2) = [bi, ci] and A
A
i = A
A
i (c1, c2) = [0, ci],
where bi = ci − 	i(ci − cL), for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The R&D cost reduction investment programs a1 and a2 of the Firms
determine a bijection between the investment region R+0 ×R+0 of both Firms
and the new production costs region A1 × A2, given by the map
a = (a1, a2) : R
+
0 × R+0 −→ A1 × A2
(v1, v2) 	−→ (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2))
where
ai(vi) = ci − ηi(vi + θivj)
λi + vi + θivj
.
We denote the inverse map of a by W = (W1,W2) : a
(
R
+
0 × R+0
)→ R+0 ×R+0
Wi(ai, aj) =
λi(ai − ci)(cj − aj − ηj) + θi(ai − ci)(aj − cj) + ηiθiλj(aj − cj)
hihj + θiθj(ci − ai)(aj − cj) + θiθjηj(ci − ai) + ηiθiθj(cj − aj)− ηiηjθiθj
where hi = (ci − ai − ηi).
The R&D cost reduction investment programs aA1 and a
A
2 of the Firms
determine a bijection between the investment region R+0 ×R+0 of both Firms
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and the new production costs region AA1 × AA2 , given by the map
aA = (aA1 , a
A
2 ) : R
+
0 × R+0 −→ AA1 × AA2
(v1, v2) 	−→ (aA1 (v1, v2), aA2 (v1, v2))
where
ai(vi) = ci − ηi
λi
√
vi + θivj.
We denote the inverse map of aA by WA = (WA1 ,W
A
2 ) : a
A
(
R
+
0 × R+0
) →
R
+
0 × R+0
WAi (a
A
i , a
A
j ) =
⎛
⎝(λi(ci − aAi )
ηi
)2
− θi
(
λj(cj − aAj )
ηj
)2⎞⎠ /(1− θiθj).
The new production costs region can be decomposed, at most, into three
disconnected economical regions characterized by the optimal output level
of the Firms (see Figure 2.3):
M1 the monopoly region M1 of Firm F1 that is characterized by the optimal
output level of Firm F1 being the monopoly output, hence the optimal
output level of Firm F2 is zero;
D the duopoly region D that is characterized by the optimal output levels of
both Firms being non-zero and, hence, below their monopoly output
levels;
M2 the monopoly region M2 of Firm F2 that is characterized by the optimal
output level of Firm F2 being the monopoly output and, hence the
optimal output level of Firm F1 is zero.
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The boundary between the duopoly region D and the monopoly region Mi
is lMi with i ∈ {1, 2}
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
c1
c 2
M2
D
M1 lM
1
lM
2
Figure 2.3: We exhibit the duopoly region D and the monopoly regions M1
and M2 for Firms F1 and F2, respectively, in terms of their new production
costs (a1, a2); lMi with i ∈ {1, 2} are the boundaries between Mi and D.
Lemma 2.2.1 The boundary between the monopoly region M2 and the duopoly
region D is the segment line lM2 given by
a2 =
2β2
γ
(a1 − α1) + α2.
Proof: By equation (2.5), we have that
q∗1 = (2β2α1 − γα2 − 2β2a1 + γa2)/(4β1β2 − γ2).
Hence, q∗1 becomes zero if, and only if,
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2β2α1 − γα2 − 2β2a1 + γa2 = 0.

Lemma 2.2.2 The boundary between the monopoly region M1 and the duopoly
region D is the segment line lM1 given by
a2 =
γ
2β1
(a1 − α1) + α2.
Proof: Analogous to the previous proof.

In equilibrium, i.e. when both Firms choose their optimal output levels,
the proﬁt function πi : Ai × Aj → R of Firm Fi, in terms of its new
production costs (a1, a2), is a piecewise smooth continuous function given
by
πi(a1, a2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
πi,Mi , if (a1, a2) ∈Mi
πi,D, if (a1, a2) ∈ D
−Wi(a1, a2), if (a1, a2) ∈Mj
,
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where
πi,Mi = πi,Mi(a1, a2; c1, c2) =
(αi − ai)2
4βi
−Wi(a1, a2)
πi,D = πi,D(a1, a2; c1, c2) =
βi (2βj(αi − ai)− γ(αj − aj))2
(4βiβj − γ2)2
−Wi(a1, a2)
2.2.4 Best R&D investment response functions
We can now derive the best investment response function V1(v2) of Firm F1
to a given investment v2 of Firm F2:
V1(v2) = argmax
v1
π1(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
We will study separately the cases where the new production costs belong to
(i) the monopoly region M1; (ii) the duopoly region D; (iii) the monopoly
region M2. First, we compute the best investment response function for
the FOP-Model when the Firms are in pure competition. Afterwards we
do the same computations when the Firms decide to go on a Joint Venture
together. Finally, we determine the best investment response function for
the AJ-Model when Firms are in pure competition and when the Firms
decide to go on a Joint Venture together.
FOP-Model
Here, we compute the best investment response functions for the FOP-
Model. If there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1v2)) ∈ M1, we select
the best response v1 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M1,
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to the investment v2 of Firm F2 as follows: Let ZM1 be the set of solutions
v1 of the following equation
∂π1,M1
∂v1
= 0,
such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M1. Let FM1 be the set of v1 such that
(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ lM1 . The best response v1 of Firm F1 in M1 is given
by
v1 = arg max
v1∈ZM1∪FM1
π1,M1(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
Since the investment v2 is ﬁxed, let us characterize the set ZMi .
Let Li = 6βiλ
2
i − η2i λi + ηiλi(ci − αi) and Ni = 2βiλ3i + ηiλ2i (ci − αi).
Theorem 2.2.1 Let vi be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ Mi. The set
ZMi is the set of zeros of the following polynomial:
2βiv
3
i + 6βiλiv
2
i + Livi + Ni = 0 (2.7)
Proof: Let us compute
dπi,M
dvi
=
∂πi,M
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,M
∂vi
Hence dπi,M/dvi = 0, if and only if
ηiλi(αi − ai)
2βi(λi + vi)2
= 1
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Since ai = ci − (ηivi)/(λi + vi), the previous expression can be written as
ηiλi(αi − ci) + λiη
2
i vi
λi + vi
= 2βi(λ
2
i + 2λivi + v
2
1)
That is equivalent to
ηiλi(αi − ci)vi + ηiλ2i (αi − ci) + η2i λivi = 2βiλ3i + 2βiλ2i vi +
+ 4βiλ
2
i vi + 4βiλiv
2
i + 2βiλiv
2
i + 2βiv
3
i .
The above equality is equivalent to (2.7).

If there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D, we select the
best response v1 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D, to the
new production cost a2 of Firm F2 as follows: Let ZD be the set of zeros v1
of the following polynomial
∂π1,D
∂v1
= 0,
such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The best response v1 of Firm F1 in D
is given by
v1 = arg max
v1∈ZD∪FM1
π1,D(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
Let us characterize the set ZD.
Let Ai = 4βiβjηiλi, Bi = 2βiγηjλj, C = (4βiβj − γ2)2, Ei = αi − ci + ηi,
Fi = 2βjEi − γEj, Gi = −2βjηiλi and Hi = γηiλi.
Theorem 2.2.2 Let (v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The
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set ZD is the set of zeros of the following polynomial:
f1(θi, θj,Wi,Wj)− θjf2(θi, θj,Wi,Wj) = 0 (2.8)
where
f1(θi, θj,Wi,Wj) = −CW 3i W 3j + AiFiWiW 3j + AiGiW 3j + AiHjW 2j Wi,
f2(θi, θj,Wi,Wj) = BiFiWjW
3
i + BiGiW
2
i Wj + BiHjW
3
i ,
and Wi = λi + vi + θivj.
Proof: Since Wi = λi + vi + θivj, we get αi − ai = Ei − ηiλi/Wi and
aj − αj = −Ej + ηjλj/Wj.
Let us compute
dπi,D
dvi
=
∂πi,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂vi
. (2.9)
We have that
∂πi,D
∂ai
= −4βiβj (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
=
−4βiβj(Fi + Gi/Wi + Hj/Wj)
C
,
∂ai
∂vi
= − ηiλi
(λi + vi + θivj)2
=
−ηiλi
W 2i
,
∂πi,D
∂aj
=
2βiγ (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
=
2βiγ(Fi + Gi/Wi + Hj/Wj)
C
,
∂aj
∂vi
= − θjηjλj
(λj + vj + θjvi)2
=
−ηjθjλj
W 2j
,
∂πi,D
∂vi
= −1.
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Using the previous equalities in equation (2.9), we get
dπi,D
dvi
=
−4βiβj(Fi + Gi/Wi + Hj/Wj)
C
−ηiλi
W 2i
+
+
2βiγ(Fi + Gi/Wi + Hj/Wj)
C
−ηjθjλj
W 2j
− 1
Hence, dπi,D/dvi = 0 if, and only if
−CW 3i W 3j +AiFiWiW 3j + AiGiW 3j +AiHjW 2j Wi −
− θj
(
BiFiWjW
3
i +BiGiW
2
i Wj +BiHjW
3
i
)
= 0

Let Ii = −AiFi/C, Ji = −AiHi/C and Ki = −AiGi/C.
Corollary 2.2.1 Suppose that Firms use patents (i.e. without spillovers, θi =
θj = 0). Let (v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1), a2(v2)) ∈ D. The set ZD is the set of
zeros of the following polynomial:
V 3i Vj + IiViVj + JiVi +KiVj = 0, (2.10)
where Vi = λi + vi.
Proof: From (2.8), making θi = θj = 0 we get
CV 3j V
3
i −AiFiV 3j Vi −AiGiV 3j −AiHiViV 2j = 0.
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Since Vj = 0, the previous equation can be written as (2.10).

If there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M2, the best response
v2 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M2, is given by Firm F1
investing zero, i.e. not investing. Hence, V1(v2) is given by
V1(v2) = argmax
v1∈F
π1(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)),
where V1 ∈ F = ZM1 ∪ FM1 ∪ ZD ∪ {0}.
We note that, the best investment response function Vi : R+0 → R+0 can be a
multi-valued function.
Theorem 2.2.3 The best investment response function Vi : R+0 → R+0 of Firm
Fi is explicitly computed.
Proof: Using lM1 and lM2 we know, explicitly, the domains ZD and ZM . Applying
Theorem 2.2.2, we ﬁnd the investment critical points and we check, using lM1 and
lM2 , if they belong to ZD. If so, we keep them, otherwise we discard them. We
apply Theorem 2.2.1, to ﬁnd the investment critical points and we check, using
lM1 and lM2 , if they belong to ZM . If so, we keep them, otherwise we discard
them. Finally, we compare the proﬁt values along the boundaries of ZD and
ZM with the proﬁt values attained at the critical points kept in ZD and ZM to
determine the best investment vi for Firm Fi.

FOP-Model with Joint Venture
Here, we compute the best investment response functions when both Firms decide
to go on a Joint Venture program together. Thus, the equivalents to Theorems
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2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are computed for this case. Since they go on a Joint Venture
program, each Firm maximizes the sum of both Firms proﬁts when taking their
decisions. Thus, π = π1 + π2.
Theorem 2.2.4 Let vi be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈Mi. The set ZMi is
the set of zeros of the following polynomial:
2βiv3i + 6βiλiv
2
i + Livi +Ni = 0.
Proof: If (ai, cj) ∈Mi, then π = πi + πj = πi. Thus Theorem 2.2.1 still holds in
the case of Joint venture.

Theorem 2.2.5 Let (v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The set
ZD is the set of zeros of the following polynomial:
f1(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) + θjf2(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = 0 (2.11)
where
f1(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = CW 3i W
3
j + (Ai −BjFj)WiW 3j + (Ai −BjGj)W 2j Wi +
+ (AiGi −BjHi)W 3j ,
f2(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = (Aj −BiFi)W 3i Wj + (Aj +BiGi)W 2i Wj + (Aj −BiHj)W 3i ,
and Wi = λi + vi + θivj.
Proof: Since Wi = λi + vi + θivj , we get αi − ai = Ei − ηiλi/Wi and aj − αj =
−Ej+ηjλj/Wj . Since we are in the case where Firms cooperate via Joint Venture,
the proﬁt both Firms want to optimize is given by π = πi + πj .
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Let us compute
dπD
dvi
=
∂πi,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂vi
+
∂πj,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πj,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πj,D
∂vi
(2.12)
We have that
∂πi,D
∂ai
= −4βiβj (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
=
−4βiβj(Fi +Gi/Wi +Hj/Wj)
C
,
∂ai
∂vi
= − ηiλi
(λi + vi + θivj)2
=
−ηiλi
W 2i
,
∂πi,D
∂aj
=
2βiγ (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
=
2βiγ(Fi +Gi/Wi +Hj/Wj)
C
,
∂aj
∂vi
= − θjηjλj
(λj + vj + θjvi)2
=
−ηjθjλj
W 2j
,
∂πj,D
∂ai
= −2γβj (2βi(αj − aj) + γ(ai − αi))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
=
2γβj(Fj +Gj/Wj +Hi/Wi)
C
,
∂πj,D
∂aj
=
−4βiβj(Fj +Gj/Wj +Hi/Wi)
C
,
∂πi,D
∂vi
= −1.
Using the previous equalities in equation (2.12), we get
dπi,D
dvi
=
2βiγ(Fj +Gj/Wj +Hi/Wi)
C
−ηiλi
W 2i
+
+
−4βiβj(Fj +Gj/Wj +Hi/Wi)
C
−ηjλjθj
W 2j
+
+
−4βiβj(Fi +Gi/Wi +Hj/Wj)
C
−ηiλi
W 2i
+
+
2βiγ(Fi +Gi/Wi +Hj/Wj)
C
−ηjλjθj
W 2j
− 1
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Hence, dπi,D/dvi = 0 if, and only if
− CW 3i W 3j + (Ai −BjFj)WiW 3j + (Ai −BjGj)W 2j Wi + (AiGi −BjHi)W 3j +
+ θj
(
(Aj −BiFi)W 3i Wj + (Aj +BiGi)W 2i Wj + (Aj −BiHj)W 3i
)
= 0

Corollary 2.2.2 Suppose that Firms use patents (i.e. without spillovers, θi =
θj = 0).Let(v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The set ZD is the set
of zeros of the following polynomial:
CW 3i W
3
j + (Ai −BjFj)WiW 3j + (Ai −BjGj)W 2j Wi +
+ (AiGi −BjHi)W 3j = 0 (2.13)
where Wi = λi + vi.
Proof: From (2.11), making θi = θj = 0 we get (2.13).

AJ-Model
Here, we compute the best investment response functions for the AJ-Model. If
there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈M1, we select the best response
v1 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M1, to the investment v2 of
Firm F2 as follows: Let ZM1 be the set of solutions v1 of the following equation
∂π1,M1
∂v1
= 0,
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such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M1. Let FM1 be the set of v1 such that
(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ lM1 . The best response v1 of Firm F1 in M1 is given
by
v1 = arg max
v1∈ZM1∪FM1
π1,M1(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
Since the investment v2 is ﬁxed, let us characterize the set ZMi .
Theorem 2.2.6 Let vi be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈Mi. The set ZMi is
given by:
vi =
(
ηiλi(αi − ci)
4βiλ2i − 
2i (ci − cL)2
)2
.
Proof: We have that
∂πi,M
∂ai
=
(ai − αi)
2βi
,
∂ai
∂vi
= − ηi
2λi
√
vi
,
∂πi
∂vi
= −1.
Thus,
dπi,M
dvi
=
(αi − ai)
2βi
ηi
2λi
√
vi
− 1
=
ηi(αi − ai)
4βiλi
√
vi
− 1
Hence, dπi,M/dvi = 0 if, and only if
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vi =
(
ηiλi(αi − ci)
4βiλ2i − 
2i (ci − cL)2
)2

If there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D, we select the best
response v1 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D, to the new
production cost a2 of Firm F2 as follows: Let ZD be the set of zeros v1 of the
following polynomial
∂π1,D
∂v1
= 0,
such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The best response v1 of Firm F1 in D is
given by
v1 = arg max
v1∈ZD∪FM1
π1,D(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
Let us characterize the set ZD.
Let Oi = −4βiβj/(4βiβj − γ2)2.
Theorem 2.2.7 Let (v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The set
ZD is the set of zeros of the following polynomial:
f1(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) + θjf2(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = 0 (2.14)
where
f1(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = W 2j (2λiλjβjγOiηiηj) +WiWj
(−4β2jλ2jη2i Oi − 4βjλ2iλ2j)+
+ Wj
(−4Oiβ2j ηiλiλ2j (αi − ci) + 2λiλ2jβjγηiOi(αj − cj))
f2(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = W 2i (2βjλiλjOiγηiηj) +WiWj
(−Oiγ2η2jλ2i )+
+ Wi
(
2βjλ2iλjOiγηj(αi − ci)−Oiλjλ2i γ2ηj(αj − cj)
)
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and Wi =
√
vi + θivj .
Proof: Note that Wi =
√
vi + θivj . Thus, Let us compute
dπi,D
dvi
=
∂πi,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂vi
. (2.15)
We have that
∂πi,D
∂ai
= −4βiβj (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= 2Oiβj(αi − ci) + 2βjηiOi
λi
Wi −
− γOi(αj − cj)− γηjOi
λj
Wj ,
∂ai
∂vi
= −ηi(ci − cL)
2λiWi
= − ηi
2λiWi
,
∂πi,D
∂aj
=
2βiγ (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= −Oiγ(αi − ci)− Oiγηi
λi
Wi +
+
Oiγ
2
2βj
(αj − cj) + Oiγ
2ηj
2βjλj
Wj ,
∂aj
∂vi
= −θjηj(cj − cL)
2λjWj
= − ηjθj
2λjWj
,
∂πi,D
∂vi
= −1.
Using the previous equalities in equation (2.15), we get
dπi,D
dvi
=
(
2Oiβj(αi − ci) + 2βjηiOi
λi
Wi − γOi(αj − cj)− γηjOi
λj
Wj
)(
− ηi
2λiWi
)
+
+
(
−Oiγ(αi − ci)− Oiγηi
λi
Wi +
Oiγ
2
2βj
(αj − cj) + Oiγ
2ηj
2βjλj
Wj
)(
− ηjθj
2λjWj
)
− 1
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Hence, dπi,D/dvi = 0 if, and only if
W 2j (2λiλjβjγOiηiηj) +WiWj
(−4β2jλ2jη2i Oi − 4βjλ2iλ2j)+
+ Wj
(−4Oiβ2j ηiλiλ2j (αi − ci) + 2λiλ2jβjγηiOi(αj − cj))+
+ θj
(
W 2i (2βjλiλjOiγηiηj) +WiWj
(−Oiγ2η2jλ2i )+
+ Wi
(
2βjλ2iλjOiγηj(αi − ci)−Oiλjλ2i γ2ηj(αj − cj)
)
= 0

Corollary 2.2.3 Suppose that Firms use patents (i.e. without spillovers, θi =
θj = 0).Let(v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The set ZD is the set
of zeros of the following polynomial:
W 2j (2λiλjβjγOiηiηj) +WiWj
(−4β2jλ2jη2i Oi − 4βjλ2iλ2j)+
+ Wj
(−4Oiβ2j ηiλiλ2j (αi − ci) + 2λiλ2jβjγηiOi(αj − cj)) = 0 (2.16)
where Wi =
√
vi.
Proof: From (2.14), making θi = θj = 0 we get (2.16).

If there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M2, the best response
v1 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M2, is given by Firm F1
investing zero, i.e. not investing. Hence, V1(v2) is given by
V1(v2) = argmax
v1∈F
π1(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)),
where V1 ∈ F = ZM1 ∪ FM1 ∪ ZD ∪ {0}.
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Theorem 2.2.8 The best investment response function Vi : R+0 → R+0 of Firm
Fi is explicitly computed.
Proof: Analogous to Theorem 2.2.3.

AJ-Model with Joint Venture
Here, we compute the best investment response functions when both Firms decide
to go on a Joint Venture program together. Thus, the equivalents to Theorems
2.2.6 and 2.2.7 are computed for this case. Since they go on a Joint Venture
program, each Firm maximizes the sum of both Firms proﬁts when taking their
decisions. Thus, π = π1 + π2.
Theorem 2.2.9 Let vi be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈Mi. The set ZMi is
given by:
vi =
(
ηiλi(αi − ci)
4βiλ2i − 
2i (ci − cL)2
)2
.
Proof: If (ai, cj) ∈Mi, then π = πi + πj = πi. Thus Theorem 2.2.6 still holds in
the case of Joint venture.

If there is v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D, we select the best
response v1 of Firm F1, restricted to (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D, to the new
production cost a2 of Firm F2 as follows: Let ZD be the set of zeros v1 of the
following polynomial
∂π
∂v1
= 0,
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such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The best response v1 of Firm F1 in D is
given by
v1 = arg max
v1∈ZD∪FM1
π(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
Let us characterize the set ZD.
Theorem 2.2.10 Let (v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The set
ZD is the set of zeros of the following polynomial:
f1(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) + θjf2(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = 0 (2.17)
where
f1(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = W 2j (2λiλjβiβjγOiηiηj + 2Oiγηiηjβiβj) +
+ WiWj
(−4β2j βiλ2jη2i Oi − 4βiβjλ2iλ2j − 2Oiγ2η2i βiβjλ2j)+
+ Wj(−4Oiβiβ2j ηiλiλ2j (αi − ci) + 2λiλ2jβiβjγηiOi(αj − cj) +
+ 2Oiγηiβiβjλiλ2j (αj − cj)−Oiηiγ2λiλ2jβi(αi − ci))
f2(θi, θj ,Wi,Wj) = W 2i (2βiβjλiλjOiγηiηj + 2Oiγηiηjλiλjβiβj) +
+ WiWj(−Oiγ2η2jλ2iβi − 4β2i Oiη2jλ2iβj) +
+ Wi(2βiβjλ2iλjOiγηj(αi − ci)−Oiβiλ2i γ2ηj(αj − cj)−
− 4Oiβ2i βjηjλjλ2i (αj − cj) + 2Oiγηjλjλ2iβiβj(αi − ci))
and Wi =
√
vi + θivj .
Proof: Note that Wi =
√
vi + θivj . Since we are in the case where Firms
cooperate via Joint Venture, the proﬁt both Firms want to optimize is given by
π = πi + πj .
Let us compute
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dπD
dvi
=
∂πi,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂vi
+
∂πj,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πj,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πj,D
∂vi
. (2.18)
We have that
∂πi,D
∂ai
= −4βiβj (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= 2Oiβj(αi − ci) + 2βjηiOi
λi
Wi −
− γOi(αj − cj)− γηjOi
λj
Wj ,
∂ai
∂vi
= −ηi(ci − cL)
2λiWi
= − ηi
2λiWi
,
∂πi,D
∂aj
=
2βiγ (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= −Oiγ(αi − ci)− Oiγηi
λi
Wi +
+
Oiγ
2
2βj
(αj − cj) + Oiγ
2ηj
2βjλj
Wj ,
∂aj
∂vi
= −θjηj(cj − cL)
2λjWj
= − ηjθj
2λjWj
,
∂πj,D
∂ai
= −2γβj (2βi(αj − aj) + γ(ai − αi))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= −Oiγ(αj − cj)− Oiγηj
λj
Wj +
+
Oiγ
2
2βi
(αi − ci) + Oiγ
2ηi
λi
Wi,
∂πj,D
∂aj
= 2Oiβi(αj − cj) + 2βiOiηj
λj
Wj −Oiγ(αi − ci)− Oiγηi
λi
Wi,
∂πi,D
∂vi
= −1,
∂πj,D
∂vi
= 0.
Using the previous equalities in equation (2.18), we get
dπD
dvi
=
(
2Oiβj(αi − ci) + 2βjηiOi
λi
Wi − γOi(αj − cj)− γηjOi
λj
Wj
)(
− ηi
2λiWi
)
+
+
(
−Oiγ(αi − ci)− Oiγηi
λi
Wi +
Oiγ
2
2βj
(αj − cj) + Oiγ
2ηj
2βjλj
Wj
)(
− ηjθj
2λjWj
)
− 1+
58 Cournot competition Models
+
(
−Oiγ(αj − cj)− Oiγηj
λj
Wj +
Oiγ
2
2βi
(αi − ci) + Oiγ
2ηi
λi
Wi
)(
− ηi
2λiWi
)
+
+
(
2Oiβi(αj − cj) + 2βiOiηj
λj
Wj −Oiγ(αi − ci)− Oiγηi
λi
Wi
)(
− ηjθj
2λjWj
)
Hence, dπi,D/dvi = 0 if, and only if
W 2j (2λiλjβiβjγOiηiηj + 2Oiγηiηjβiβj) +
+ WiWj
(−4β2j βiλ2jη2i Oi − 4βiβjλ2iλ2j − 2Oiγ2η2i βiβjλ2j)+
+ Wj(−4Oiβiβ2j ηiλiλ2j (αi − ci) + 2λiλ2jβiβjγηiOi(αj − cj) +
+ 2Oiγηiβiβjλiλ2j (αj − cj)−Oiηiγ2λiλ2jβi(αi − ci)) +
+ θj(W 2i (2βiβjλiλjOiγηiηj + 2Oiγηiηjλiλjβiβj) +
+ WiWj(−Oiγ2η2jλ2iβi − 4β2i Oiη2jλ2iβj) +
+ Wi(2βiβjλ2iλjOiγηj(αi − ci)−Oiβiλ2i γ2ηj(αj − cj)−
− 4Oiβ2i βjηjλjλ2i (αj − cj) + 2Oiγηjλjλ2iβiβj(αi − ci)) = 0

Corollary 2.2.4 Suppose that Firms use patents (i.e. without spillovers, θi =
θj = 0).Let(v1, v2) be such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. The set ZD is the set
of zeros of the following polynomial:
W 2j (2λiλjβiβjγOiηiηj + 2Oiγηiηjβiβj) +
+ WiWj
(−4β2j βiλ2jη2i Oi − 4βiβjλ2iλ2j − 2Oiγ2η2i βiβjλ2j)+
+ Wj(−4Oiβiβ2j ηiλiλ2j (αi − ci) + 2λiλ2jβiβjγηiOi(αj − cj) +
+ 2Oiγηiβiβjλiλ2j (αj − cj)−Oiηiγ2λiλ2jβi(αi − ci)) = 0 (2.19)
where Wi =
√
vi.
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Proof: From (2.17), making θi = θj = 0 we get (2.19).

2.3 Nash investment equilibria
Let cL be the minimum attainable production cost and α the market saturation.
Given production costs (c1, c2) ∈ [cL, α1]×[cL, α2], the Nash investment equilibria
(v1, v2) ∈ R+0 × R+0 are the solutions of the system
⎧⎨
⎩ v1 = V1(v2)v2 = V2(v1)
where V1 and V2 are the best investment response functions computed in the
previous sections. All the results presented hold in an open region of parameters
(cL, 
i, αi, λi, βi, γi, θi, θj) containing the point (4, 0.2, 10, 10, 0.013, 0.013, 0, 0).
For the FOP-Model, we ﬁnd four diﬀerent regions of Nash investment equi-
libria namely, a competitive Nash investment region C where both Firms invest,
a single Nash investment region S1 for Firm F1, where only Firm F1 invests, a
single Nash investment region S2 for Firm F2, where only Firm F2 invests, and
a nil Nash investment region N , where neither of the Firms invest (see Figure
2.4). The single Nash investment region Si can be decomposed into two disjoint
regions: a single favorable Nash investment region SFi where the production costs,
after investment, are favorable to Firm Fi; and a single recovery Nash investment
region SRi where the production costs, after investment are, still, favorable to
Firm Fj but Firm Fi recovers, slightly, from its initial disadvantage. The eco-
nomical reasons for Firm Fj deciding not to invest in the single favorable Nash
investment region SFi and in the single recovery Nash investment region S
R
i are
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opposite. In the single favorable Nash investment region SFi , the production costs
of Firm Fj are too high for the Firm Fj to recover its investment by increasing
its proﬁt due to decreasing its production costs. In the single recovery Nash in-
vestment region SRi , the production costs of Firm Fj are too low for the Firm
Fj to be willing to invest to decrease, even more, its production costs and, so,
Firm Fi is able to decrease its production costs by investing. The single favorable
Nash investment region SFi can also be decomposed into three regions: the sin-
gle duopoly region SDi , the single monopoly region S
M
i and the single monopoly
boundary region SBi . The single monopoly region S
M
i consists of all production
costs such that, after Firm Fi’s investment, the new production costs are in the
monopoly region of Firm Fi. The single monopoly boundary region SBi consists
of all production costs such that, after Firm Fi’s investment, the new production
costs are in the boundary between the monopoly region and the duopoly region
of Firm Fi. The single duopoly region SDi consists of all production costs such
that, after the Firm Fi’s investment, the new production costs are still in the
duopoly region of Firm Fi. The economical reasons for both Firms choosing not
to invest in the nil Nash investment regions NLL, NHL, NLH and NHH are quite
diﬀerent. In the region NLL, neither of the Firms invest because the Firms al-
ready have so low costs that the investment is not recovered by the increase in
the proﬁt associated to the decrease of their production costs. In the region NLH
(respectively NHL), neither of the Firms invest because Firm F1 (respectively
F2) has so low production costs and Firm F2 (respectively F1) has so high pro-
duction costs that if one Firm invests and decreases its production costs, then it
is not able to recover its investment with the corresponding increase in the proﬁt
associated to the new production costs. In the region NHH neither of the Firms
invest because the Firms already have so high production costs that the invest-
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ment is not recovered by the increase in the proﬁt associated to the decrease of
their production costs. In the AJ-Model we only ﬁnd three diﬀerent Nash in-
vestment equilibria regions, i.e., the competitive Nash investment region C and
the single Nash investment regions S1 and S2. This diﬀerent behavior is due to
the shape of d’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin’s R&D cost reduction investment
function traducing an higher incentive to invest reﬂected in the disappearance of
the nil Nash investment region. We also ﬁnd that, for the FOP-Model, the Nash
investment equilibria consists of a unique, or two, or three points depending upon
the pair of initial production costs, as we will explain throughout this Section.
The set of all Nash investment equilibria form the Nash investment equilibrium
set. We now present the Nash investment equilibria by considering the following
three regions of production costs:
C the competitive Nash investment region C that is characterized by both Firms
investing;
Si the single Nash investment region Si that is characterized by only one of the
Firms investing;
N the nil Nash investment region N that is characterized by neither of the Firms
investing.
Denote by R = [cL, α1]× [cL, α2] the region of all possible pairs of productions
costs (c1, c2). Let Ac = R − A be the complementary of A in R. As shown in
Figure 2.4 where we exhibit the Nash investment regions for the FOP-Model,
(i) the intersection RS1∩S2 = (SM1 ∪ SB1 ) ∩ (SM2 ∪ SB2 ) ∩ Cc between the single
Nash investment regions S1 and S2 is non empty; (ii) the intersection RC∩Si =
C ∩ (SMi ∪ SBi ) ∩ Scj with i = j between the competitive Nash investment region
C and the single Nash investment region Si is non empty; (iii) for high enough
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Figure 2.4: Full characterization, for the FOP-Model, of the Nash invest-
ment regions in terms of the Firms’ initial production costs (c1, c2). The
monopoly lines lMi are colored black. The nil Nash investment region N is
colored grey. The single Nash investment regions S1 and S2 are colored blue
and red, respectively. The competitive Nash investment region C is colored
green. The region where S1 and S2 intersect are colored pink, the region
where S1 and C intersect are colored lighter blue and the region where S2
and C intersect are colored yellow. The region where the regions S1, S2 and
C intersect are colored lighter grey.
2.3 Nash investment equilibria 63
initial production costs, unexpectedly, the intersection RS1∩C∩S2 = (SM1 ∪ SB1 )∩
C ∩ (SM2 ∪SB2 ) between the competitive Nash investment region C and the single
Nash investment regions S1 and S2 is non empty.
In Figure 2.5, we illustrate the Nash investment regions for the AJ-Model.
We observe that there are only three diﬀerent Nash investment equilibria regions:
a competitive Nash investment region C, a single Nash investment region S1 for
Firm F1 and a single Nash investment region S2 for Firm F2. Moreover, the
regions with multiple Nash investment equilibria, RS1∩S2 , RC∩Si and RS1∩C∩S2 ,
that appear in the FOP-Model, no longer exist.
Figure 2.5: Full characterization, for the AJ-Model, of the Nash investment
regions in terms of the Firms’ initial production costs (c1, c2). The monopoly
lines lMi are colored black. The single Nash investment regions S1 and S2
are colored blue and red, respectively. The competitive Nash investment
region C is colored green.
In the next Figures, we exhibit both for the FOP-Model and the AJ-Model:
the Firms’ Nash investment equilibria (see Figure 2.6), the Firms’ Proﬁts (see
Figure 2.7), the Firms’ new production costs (see Figure 2.8), the ratio between
the Firms’ investment on R&D and their total income (see Figure 2.9). We ob-
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serve that the Firms choose higher values of investment when the production
costs take intermediate values. Moreover, there is a discontinuity in the produ-
ction costs between the monopoly and the duopoly regions. We also observe that
each Firm has higher proﬁts when its own production cost is low and the other
Firm’s production cost is high. For the Firms’ proﬁts, we notice a discontinuity
in the derivative, when the production costs change from the monopoly to the
duopoly region. For the percentage of the Firms’ total proﬁt invested in R&D,
we observe that, the higher the production costs, the higher the ratio is. In par-
ticular, for the FOP-Model, when the production costs are really high, the Firms’
investment in R&D is almost all their entire proﬁt.
A B
Figure 2.6: Firms’ Nash investments in terms of their initial production
costs (c1, c2). The Nash investment for Firm F1 in the competitive Nash
investment region C are colored blue and the Nash investment for Firm F2
in the competitive Nash investment region C are colored green. The Nash
investments in the single Nash investment region S1 (respectively S2) are
colored lighter blue (respectively yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model.
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A B
Figure 2.7: Firms’ proﬁts in terms of their initial production costs (c1, c2).
The Nash investment for Firm F1 in the competitive Nash investment region
C are colored blue and the Nash investment for Firm F2 in the competitive
Nash investment region C are colored green. The Firms’ proﬁts in the
single Nash investment region S1 (respectively S2) are colored lighter blue
(respectively yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model.
A B
Figure 2.8: Firms’ new production costs in terms of their initial production
costs (c1, c2). The Nash investment for Firm F1 in the competitive Nash
investment region C are colored blue and the Nash investment for Firm F2
in the competitive Nash investment region C are colored green. The Firms’
new production costs in the single Nash investment region S1 (respectively
S2) are colored lighter blue (respectively yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B)
AJ-Model.
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A B
Figure 2.9: Percentage of the Firms’ total proﬁt invested in R&D in terms
of their initial production costs (c1, c2). The Nash investment for Firm
F1 in the competitive Nash investment region C are colored blue and the
Nash investment for Firm F2 in the competitive Nash investment region
C are colored green. The Firms’ new production costs in the single Nash
investment region S1 (respectively S2) are colored lighter blue (respectively
yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model.
In Figure 2.10, we exhibit how the Nash investment regions change when the
Firms go on a Joint Venture program. Note that for the AJ-Model, we observe
the appearance of two regions with multiple equilibria: a region with a single
Nash investment equilibrium S1 and a competitive Nash investment equilibrium
C and a region with a single Nash investment equilibrium S2 and a competitive
Nash investment equilibrium C. Next, we show how the Firms’ Nash investment
equilibria (see Figure 2.11), the Firms’ Proﬁts (see Figure 2.12), the Firms’ new
production costs (see Figure 2.13), the ratio between the Firms’ investment on
R&D and their total income (see Figure 2.14) change when the Firms decide to go
on a Joint Venture program. Notice that the competitive region is much smaller
for both Firms when they go on a joint venture together.
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A B
C D
Figure 2.10: Full characterization of the Nash investment regions in terms
of the Firms’ initial production costs (c1, c2). The monopoly lines lMi are
colored black. The nil Nash investment region N is colored grey. The single
Nash investment regions S1 and S2 are colored blue and red, respectively.
The competitive Nash investment region C is colored green. The region
where S1 and S2 intersect are colored pink, the region where S1 and C
intersect are colored lighter blue and the region where S2 and C intersect
are colored yellow. The region where the regions S1, S2 and C intersect
are colored lighter grey. (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model; (C) Zoom of (B);
(D) Zoom of (B).
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A B
Figure 2.11: Firms’ Nash investments in terms of their initial production
costs (c1, c2). The Nash investment for Firm F1 in the competitive Nash
investment region C are colored blue and the Nash investment for Firm F2
in the competitive Nash investment region C are colored green. The Nash
investments in the single Nash investment region S1 (respectively S2) are
colored lighter blue (respectively yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model.
A B
Figure 2.12: Firms’ proﬁts in terms of their initial production costs (c1, c2).
The Nash investment for Firm F1 in the competitive Nash investment region
C are colored blue and the Nash investment for Firm F2 in the competitive
Nash investment region C are colored green. The Firms’ proﬁts in the
single Nash investment region S1 (respectively S2) are colored lighter blue
(respectively yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model.
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A B
Figure 2.13: Firms’ new production costs in terms of their initial production
costs (c1, c2). The Nash investment for Firm F1 in the competitive Nash
investment region C are colored blue and the Nash investment for Firm F2
in the competitive Nash investment region C are colored green. The Firms’
new production costs in the single Nash investment region S1 (respectively
S2) are colored lighter blue (respectively yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B)
AJ-Model.
A B
Figure 2.14: Percentage of the Firms’ total proﬁt invested in R&D in terms
of their initial production costs (c1, c2). The Nash investment for Firm
F1 in the competitive Nash investment region C are colored blue and the
Nash investment for Firm F2 in the competitive Nash investment region
C are colored green. The Firms’ new production costs in the single Nash
investment region S1 (respectively S2) are colored lighter blue (respectively
yellow). (A) FOP-Model; (B) AJ-Model.
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2.4 FOP-Model boundary characterization
In this Section we present, for the FOP-Model, a full characterization of the
boundaries of the Nash investment regions described previously. We study sepa-
rately the boundaries of the single Nash investment region (see Subsection 2.4.1),
the nil Nash investment region (see Subsection 2.4.2) and the competitive Nash
investment region (see Subsection 2.4.3).
2.4.1 Single Nash investment region
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Figure 2.15: Full characterization of the single Nash investment region S1
and of the nil Nash investment region N in terms of the Firms’ initial
production costs (c1, c2). The subregions NLL, NLH , NHL and NHH of the
nil Nash investment region N are colored yellow. The subregion SR1 of the
single Nash investment region S1 is colored lighter blue. The subregion S
F
1
of the single Nash investment region S1 is decomposed in three subregions:
the single Duopoly region SDi colored blue, the single Monopoly region S
M
i
colored green and the single Monopoly boundary region SBi colored red.
The single Nash investment region Si consists of the set of production costs
(c1, c2) with the property that the Nash investment equilibrium set contains a
2.4 FOP-Model boundary characterization 71
pair (v1, v2) with the Nash investment vi = Vi(0) > 0 and the Nash investment
vj = Vj(vi) = 0, for j = i.
The single Nash investment region Si can be decomposed into two disjoint re-
gions: a single favorable Nash investment region SFi where the production costs,
after investment, are favorable to Firm Fi, and in a single recovery Nash invest-
ment region SRi where the production costs, after investment are, still, favorable
to Firm Fj but Firm Fi recovers a little from its disadvantageous (see Figure
2.15).
The single favorable Nash investment region SFi can be decomposed into
three regions: the single Duopoly region SDi , the single Monopoly region S
M
i
and the single Monopoly boundary region SBi (see Figure 2.15). For every cost
(c1, c2) ∈ SFi , let (a1(v1), a2(v2)) be the new production costs obtained by the
Firms F1 and F2 choosing the Nash investment equilibrium (v1, v2) with vj = 0.
The single duopoly region SDi consists of all production costs (c1, c2) such that for
the Nash new investment costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)) the Firms are in the duopoly region
D (see Figure 2.15). The single monopoly region SMi consists of all production
costs (c1, c2) such that for the new production costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)) Firm Fi is in
the interior of the Monopoly region Mi. The single monopoly boundary region
SBi consists of all production costs (c1, c2) such that the new production costs
(a1(v1), a2(v2)) are in the boundary of the Monopoly region lMi.
We now characterize the boundaries of the single favorable Nash investment
region SF1 (due to the symmetry, a similar characterization holds for S
F
2 ). We
study the boundaries of SM1 by separating it into four distinct boundaries: the
upper boundary UMS1 , that is the union of a vertical segment line U
l
S1
and a curve
U cS1 , the intermediate boundary I
M
S1
, the lower boundary LMS1 and the left boundary
LeS
M
1 (see Figure 2.16). The left boundary of the single monopoly region Le
M
S1
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is the right boundary d1 of the nil Nash investment region NLH that will be
characterized in Subsection 2.4.2.
The boundary of the single monopoly boundary region SB1 is the union of a
upper boundary UBS1 and a lower boundary L
B
S1
(see Figure 2.20).
The boundary of the single duopoly region SD1 is the union of a upper boundary
UDS1 , a lower boundary L
D
S1
and a left boundary LeDS1 (see Figure 2.21). The left
boundary of the single duopoly region LeDS1 is the right boundary d3 of the nil
Nash investment region NLH that will be characterized in Subsection 2.4.2.
The single recovery Nash investment region SR1 has three boundaries: the
upper boundary URS1 , the left boundary Le
R
S1
, and the right boundary RRS1 (see
Figure 2.23).
Boundary of the single monopoly region SM1
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Figure 2.16: (A) Full characterization of the boundaries of the single
monopoly region SM1 : the upper boundary U
C
S1
is the union of a vertical
segment line U lS1 with a curve U
c
S1
; the lower boundary LMS1 ; and the left
boundary LeMS1 ; (B) Zoom of the upper part of ﬁgure (A) where the bound-
aries UCS1 and U
l
S1
can be seen in more detail.
In the following Lemmas we characterize, separately, the boundaries of the
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single monopoly region SM1 . Let us characterize the boundary U
l
S1
between the
single monopoly region SM1 and the nil Nash investment region NHH with initial
production costs (c1, c2) in the Monopoly region M1. The boundary U lS1 is a ver-
tical segment line corresponding to initial production costs (c1, c2) such that the
proﬁt π1,M1(0, 0; c1, c2) = π1,M1(v1, 0; c1, c2) where v1 = V1(0) is the best invest-
ment response of Firm F1 to a zero investment of Firm F2 (see Figure 2.17). In
Lemma 2.4.1, we give the algebraic characterization of U lS1 = {cM1 }×[lMS1(cM1 ), α1]
by determining the value cM1 . The value l
M
S1
(cM1 ) such that (c
M
1 , l
M
S1
(cM1 )) ∈ lM1
is computed using Lemma 2.2.2. Let
• K1 = −(8β1λ1 − 
21(c1 − cL)2 − 2
1(α1 − c1)(c1 − cL))/(8β1);
• K2 = (4β1λ21 − 2
1λ1(α1 − c1)(c1 − cL))/(64β1);
• K3 = −(4β1λ21 − 2
1λ1(α1 − c1)(c1 − cL))/(4β1).
Lemma 2.4.1 The initial production costs c1 = cM1 of Firm F1, such that
(cM1 , c2) ∈ U lS1 and the best investment response v1 = V1(0) of Firm F1 to a
zero investment of Firm F2 are implicitly determined as solutions of the follow-
ing polynomial equations:
2β1v31 + 6β1λ1v
2
1 + L1v1 +N1 = 0 (2.20)
K22 −K21 +K3 + 2V1K1 − V 21 = 0 (2.21)
Proof: By Theorem 2.2.1, ∂π1,M1(v1, 0; c1, c2)/∂v1 = 0 can be written as equality
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(2.20). From π1,M1(0, 0; c1, c2) =π1,M1(v1, 0; c1, c2), we get
(α1 − c1)2 =
(
α1 − c1 + 
1(c1 − cL)v1
λ1 + v1
)2
− 4β1v1
that leads to
4β1v21+(8β1λ1−
21(c1−cL)2−2
1(α1−c1)(c1−cL))v1+(4β1λ21−2
1λ1(α1−c1)(c1−cL)) = 0.
Choosing the positive solution of the above equality, we get
v1 = K1 +
√
K22 +K3
that is equivalent to equality (2.21). By Theorem 2.2.1, ∂π1,M1(v1, 0; c
M
1 (c2), c2)/∂v1 =
0 can be written as equality (2.20).

Let us characterize the boundary U cS1 between the single monopoly region S
M
1
and the nil Nash investment region NHH with initial production costs (c1, c2) in
the Monopoly region M1. The boundary U cS1 is a curve corresponding to initial
production costs (c1, c2) such that the proﬁt π1,M1(0, 0; c1, c2) = π1,M1(v1, 0; c1, c2)
where v1 = V1(0) is the best investment response of Firm F1 to a zero investment
of Firm F2 (see Figure 2.18). In Lemma 2.4.2 we give the algebraic characteriza-
tion of the curve U cS1 = {c1(c2) : c2 ∈ [B(UCS1 ; IMS1 ), lMS1(cM1 )]}. The value lMS1(cM1 )
is such that (cM1 , l
M
S1
(cM1 )) ∈ lM1 is computed and, as before, using Lemma 2.2.2.
Let B(UCS1 ; I
M
S1
) be the common boundary UCS1 ∩ IMS1 between the boundaries of
the single monopoly region UCS1 and I
M
S1
. The point B(UCS1 ; I
M
S1
) is determined
as a solution of the polynomial equations presented in Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma
2.4.2.
2.4 FOP-Model boundary characterization 75
Figure 2.17: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π1 of Firm F1 when
Firm F2 decides not to invest, i.e. π1(v1, 0; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ U lS1 , the plot in blue
(I) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single
monopoly region SM1 and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash investment region NHH .
Let
• K4 = (β1(2β2(α1 − c1)− γ(α2 − c2))2)/((4β1β2 − γ2)2);
• K5 = K4 − (α1 − c1)2 − 
21(c1 − cL)2 − 2
1(c1 − cL)(α1 − c1) + 8β1α1;
• K6 = 2λ1K4 − 2λ1(α1 − c1)2 − 2
1λ1(c1 − cL)(α1 − c1) + 4β1λ21.
Lemma 2.4.2 The initial production costs c1 = cM1 (c2) of Firm F1 such that
(cM1 (c2), c2) ∈ U cS1, and the best investment response v1 = V1(0) of Firm F1 to a
zero investment of Firm F2 are implicitly determined as solutions of the following
polynomial equations:
2βv31 + 6βλv
2
1 + L1v1 +N1 = 0 (2.22)
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and
4β1v31 +K5v
2
1 +K6v1 +K4λ
2
1 − (α1 − c1)2λ21 = 0 (2.23)
Proof: From π1,D(0, 0; c1, c2) = π1,M1(v1, 0; c1, c2) we get
β1(2β2(α1 − c1)− γ(α2 − c2))2
(4β1β2 − γ2)2 =
(
α1 − c1 + 
1(c1 − cL)v1
λ1 + v1
)2
− 4β1v1
that leads to equation (2.23). By Theorem 2.2.1, ∂π1,M1(v1, 0; c
M
1 (c2), c2)/∂v1 = 0
can be written as equality (2.22).

Figure 2.18: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π1 of Firm F1 when
Firm F2 decides not to invest, i.e. π1(v1, 0; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ U cS1 , the plot in blue
(I) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single
monopoly region SM1 and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash investment region NHH .
Let us characterize the boundary IMS1 between the single monopoly region S
M
1
and the single Nash investment region SM2 with initial production costs (c1, c2)
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in the Monopoly region M1 (see Figure 2.19). The intermediate boundary IMS1 of
the single monopoly region SM1 is characterized by the best investment response
V2(V1(0)) of Firm F2 to the best investment response V1(0) of Firm F1 to zero,
to be a set with two elements. One of the elements V −2 of V2(V1(0)) is zero and
the other element V +2 is greater than zero. In Lemma 2.4.3 we give the algebraic
characterization of the curve IMS1 = {c1(c2) : c2 ∈ [B(IMS1 ;LMS1), B(U cS1 ; IMS1 )]}.
The point B(IMS1 ;L
M
S1
) is implicitly determined as a solution of the polynomial
equations presented in Lemma 2.4.3 and Lemma 2.4.2. The point B(UCS1 ; I
M
S1
)
is determined, as before, as a solution of the polynomial equations presented in
Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.2.
Let L1 and N1 be as in Theorem 2.2.1. Let C, A2, B2 and H2 be as in Theorem
2.2.2. Let
• K7 = −4β1γ(c1 − 
1(c1 − cL))(c2 − 
2(c2 − cL));
• K8 = −4β1γ
1λ1(c2 − cL)(c1 − 
1(c1 − cL));
• K9 = −4β1γ
1λ1(c1 − cL)(c2 − 
2(c2 − cL));
• K10 = −4β1γ
1
2λ1λ2(c1 − cL)(c2 − cL);
• K11 = 4β21c21+
21(c1−cL)−2
1c1(c1−cL)+γc22+
22(c2−cL)−2
2c2(c2−cL)+
c1(8β21α1+4β1α1γ)−
1(c1−cL)(8β21α1+4β1α1γ)+c2(−2α2γ2+4β1γα2)−

2(c2−cL)(−2α2γ2+4βγ1α2)+4β21α21+γ2α22−4β1γα22+(λ1(4β1β2−γ2)2)/β2;
• K12 = −2λ1
21(c1 − cL) + 2
1λ1c1(c1 − cL) + λ1
1(c1 − cL);
• W1 = v1 + λ1; W2 = v2 + λ2.
Lemma 2.4.3 The initial production costs c1 = cM1 (c2) of Firm F1 such that
(cM1 (c2), c2) ∈ IMS1 , the best investment v1 = V1(0) of Firm F1 to a zero investment
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of Firm F2 and the best investment of Firm F2 V +2 ∈ V2(V1(0)) are implicitly
determined as solutions of the following polynomial equations:
K7W
4
1W
4
2 + K8W
4
1W
3
2 +K9W
3
1W
4
2 +K10W
3
1W
3
2 − ((4β1β2 − γ2)2/β2)W 32W 21 +
+ K11W 21W
2
2 +K12W1W
2
2 +K13W2W
2
1 + (2.24)
+ λ22

2
2(c2 − cL)W 21 + λ21
21(c1 − cL)W 22 = 0
and
CW 32W1 +A2W2W1 +B2W1 − (B2/λ2)H2W2 = 0 (2.25)
and
2β1(W1 − λ1)3 + 6β1λ1(W1 − λ1)2 + L1(W1 − λ1) +N1 = 0 (2.26)
Proof: From π2,D(v1, v2; c1, c2) = 0, we get
β2(2β1(α1 − a1)− γ(α2 − a2))2
(4β1β2 − γ2)2 − v2 = 0.
The equality above can be written as
4β21a
2
1 + γa
2
2 + (−8β21α1 + 4β1α1γ)a1 + (−2α2γ2 + 4β1γα2)a2 − 4β1γa1a2 +
+ (4β21α
2
1 + γ
2α22 − 4β1γα22)− ((4β1β2 − γ2)2/β2)v2 = 0.
Substituting ai = ci − (ηivi)/(λi + vi) and doing some algebric manipulations we
get equality (2.24). By Theorem 2.2.2, we have that ∂π2,D(v1, v2; cM1 (c2), c2)/∂v2 =
0 can be written as equality (2.25).
2.4 FOP-Model boundary characterization 79
By Theorem 2.2.1, we have that ∂π1,M1(v1, 0; c
M
1 (c2), c2)/∂v1 = 0 can be
written as equality (2.26).

Figure 2.19: Each of the plots corresponds to the Proﬁt π2 of Firm F2 when
Firm F1 decides to invest v1 and Firm F2 has two possible best responses
V2(v1) = {v2; 0} with v2 > 0, i.e. π2(V1(0), v2; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ IMS1 , the plot in blue
(I) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single
monopoly region SM1 and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single monopoly region S
M
2 .
Let us characterize the boundary LMS1 between the single monopoly region S
M
1
and the single monopoly boundary region SB1 with initial production costs (c1, c2)
in the Monopoly region M1. In Lemma 2.4.4 we give the algebraic characteri-
zation of the curve LMS1 = {c1(c2) : c2 ∈ [B(LMS1 ;LeMS1), B(IcS1 ;LMS1)]}. The point
B(LMS1 ;Le
M
S1
) is implicitly determined as a solution of the polynomial equations
presented in Lemma 2.4.4 and Theorem 2.4.2. The point B(IMS1 ;L
M
S1
) is deter-
mined, as before, as a solution of the polynomial equations presented in Lemma
2.4.3 and Lemma 2.4.4. Let L1 and N1 be as in Theorem 2.2.1.
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Lemma 2.4.4 The initial production costs c1 = cM1 (c2) of Firm F1 such that
(cM1 (c2), c2) ∈ LMS1, and the best investment v1 = V1(0) of Firm F1 to a zero
investment of Firm F2 are implicitly determined as solutions of the following
polynomial equations:
2β1v31 + 6β1λ1v
2
1 + L1v1 +N1 = 0, (2.27)
where
v1 =
γλ1(c2 − α2)− 2β2λ1(c1 − α1)
2
1β2(cL − c1) + 2β2(c1 − α1)− γ(c2 − α2) (2.28)
Proof: By Theorem 2.2.1, ∂π1,M1(v1, 0; c1, c2)/∂v1 = 0 can be written as equa-
tion (2.27). Take a1 = c1 − (
1(c1 − cL)v1)/(λ1 + v1) and a2 = c2, by Lemma
2.2.1, we get
(
γ
2β2
(c2 − α2)− (c1 − α1)
)
(λ1 + v1) = 
1(cL − c1)v1 (2.29)
Thus (2.28) follows from (2.29).

Boundary of the single monopoly boundary region SB1
The upper boundary of the single monopoly boundary region UBS1 is the lower
boundary of the single monopoly region LMS1 and has already been characte-
rized in the beginning of this Section. Let us characterize the boundary LBS1
between the single monopoly boundary region SB1 and the single duopoly region
SD1 for initial production costs (c1, c2) in the monopoly region M1. In Lemma
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Figure 2.20: Full characterization of the boundaries of the single monopoly
boundary region SB1 : the upper boundary U
B
S1
and the lower boundary LBS1 .
2.4.5 we give the algebraic characterization of the curve LBS1 = {c1(c2) : c2 ∈
[B(LDS1 ;L
B
S1
), B(LBS1 ; d3)]}. The point B(LDS1 ;LBS1) is implicitly determined as a
solution of the polynomial equations presented in Lemma 2.4.6 and Lemma 2.4.5.
The point B(LBS1 ; d3) is implicitly determined as a solution of the polynomial
equations presented Lemma 2.4.5 and Theorem 2.4.1.
Let A1, E1, F1, G1 and H1 be as in Theorem 2.4.1.
Lemma 2.4.5 The initial production costs c1 = cM1 (c2) of Firm F1 such that
(cM1 (c2), c2) ∈ LBS1 and the best investment v1 = V1(0) of Firm F1 to a zero
investment of Firm F2 are implicitly determined as solutions of the following
polynomial equations:
A1c
2
1 + E1c1c2 + F1c1 +G1c2 +H1 = 0 (2.30)
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and
v1 =
γλ1(c2 − α2)− 2β2λ1(c1 − α1)
2
1β2(cL − c1) + 2β2(c1 − α1)− γ(c2 − α2) (2.31)
Proof: By Theorem 2.4.1, ∂π1,D(v1, 0; c1, c2)/∂v2 = 0 can be written as equation
(2.30). We get equation (2.31) as in Lemma 2.4.4.

Boundary of the single duopoly region SD1
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Figure 2.21: (A) Full characterization of the boundaries of the single
duopoly region SD1 : the upper boundary U
D
S1
; the lower boundary LDS1 ; and
the left boundary LeDS1 ; (B) Zoom of the lower part of Le
D
S1
.
The upper boundary of the single duopoly region UDS1 is the lower boundary of
the single monopoly boundary region LBS1 and has already been characterized in
this Subsection. The left boundary of the single duopoly region LeDS1 is the right
boundary d3 of the nil Nash investment region NLH that will be characterized in
Subsection 2.4.2.
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Let us characterize the boundary LDS1 between the single duopoly region S
D
1
and the competitive Nash investment region C for initial production costs (c1, c2)
in the monopoly region M1 (see Figure 2.22). In Lemma 2.4.6 we give the alge-
braic characterization of the curve LDS1 = {c1(c2) : c2 ∈ [B(LBS1 ;LDS1), B(LDS1 ; d3)]}.
The point B(LBS1 ;L
D
S1
) is implicitly determined as a solution of the polynomial
equations presented in Lemma 2.4.5 and Lemma 2.4.6. The point B(LBS1 ; d3)
is implicitly determined as a solution of the polynomial equations presented in
Lemma 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.4.1.
Lemma 2.4.6 The initial production costs c1 = cM1 (c2) of Firm F1 such that
(cM1 (c2), c2) ∈ LDS1, the best investment v1 = V1(0) of Firm F1 to a zero investment
of Firm F2 and the best investment of Firm F2 V +2 ∈ V2(V1(0)) are implicitly
determined as solutions of the following polynomial equations:
K7W
4
1W
4
2 + K8W
4
1W
3
2 +K9W
3
1W
4
2 +K10W
3
1W
3
2 − ((4β1β2 − γ2)2/β2)W 32W 21 +
+ K11W 21W
2
2 +K12W1W
2
2 +K13W2W
2
1 + (2.32)
+ λ22

2
2(c2 − cL)W 21 + λ21
21(c1 − cL)W 22 = 0
and
CW 32W1 +A2W2W1 +B2W1 − (B2/λ2)H2W2 = 0 (2.33)
and
CW 31W2 +A1W1W2 +B1W2 − (B1/λ1)H1W1 = 0 (2.34)
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Proof: We get equation (2.32) as in Lemma 2.4.3.
By Theorem 2.2.2, ∂π2,D(v1, v2; c1, c2)/∂v2 = 0 can be written as equation (2.33).
By Theorem 2.2.2, ∂π1,D(v1, v2; c1, c2)/∂v1 = 0 can be written as equality (2.34).

Figure 2.22: Each of the plots corresponds to the Proﬁt π2 of Firm F2 when
Firm F1 decides not to invest. The plot in red (II) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) ∈ LDS1 , the plot in blue (I) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the competitive Nash investment region
C and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of production costs
(c1, c2) that are in the single duopoly region S
D
2 .
Boundary of the single recovery region SR1
The single recovery region SR1 (due to the symmetry, a similar characteriza-
tion holds for SR2 ) has three boundaries: the upper boundary U
R
S1
, the left boun-
dary LRS1 , and the right boundary R
R
S1
(see Figure 2.23). We are now going to
characterize the upper boundary URS1 of the single recovery region S
R
1 and will
leave the left and right boundaries of the single recovery region, that are also
boundaries of the nil Nash investment region, to be characterized in Subsection
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Figure 2.23: Full characterization of the boundaries of the single recovery
region SR1 : the upper boundary U
R
S1
; the right boundary RRS1 ; and the left
boundary LeRS1 . In green the competitive Nash investment region C, in grey
the nil Nash investment region N , in red the single Nash investment region
S2 for Firm F2 and in blue the single recovery region S
R
1 for Firm F1.
2.4.2 (see Figure 2.24). In Lemma 2.4.7 we give the algebraic characterization of
the curve URS1 = {c1(c2) : c2 ∈ [Q;P3)]} where the point Q is characterized by
being in the intersection between the competitive Nash investment region C and
the nil Nash investment region NLL and the point P3 is characterized by being in
the intersection between the competitive Nash investment region C and the nil
Nash investment region NHL.
Lemma 2.4.7 The initial production costs c1 = cR1 (c2) of Firm F1 such that
(cR1 (c2), c2) ∈ URS1 are implicitly determined as solutions of the following polyno-
mial equations:
A2c
2
2 + E2c1c2 + F2c2 +G2c1 +H2 = 0 (2.35)
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and
A1c
2
1 + E1c1c2 + F1c1 +G1c2 +H1 = 0 (2.36)
Proof: By Theorem 2.4.1, we get equations (2.35) and (2.36).

Figure 2.24: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π2 of Firm F2 when
Firm F1 decides not to invest, i.e. π2,D(V1(0), v2; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ URS1 , the plot in blue (I)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash
investment region NHL and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single recovery region S
R
1 .
2.4.2 Nil Nash investment region
The nil Nash investment region N is the set of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ N with
the property that (0, 0) is a Nash investment equilibrium. Hence, the nil Nash
investment region N consists of all production costs (c1, c2) with the property that
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Figure 2.25: Full characterization of the nil Nash investment region N in
terms of the Firms’ initial production costs (c1, c2): (A) The subregion NLL
of the nil Nash investment region N is colored grey corresponding to initial
production cost such that the Firms do not invest and do not produce; (B)
The subregion NLH of the nil Nash investment region N is colored grey
corresponding to initial production cost such that the Firms do not invest
and do not produce and dark blue corresponding to cases where the Firms
do not invest but Firm F1 produces a certain amount q1 greater than zero;
(C) The subregion NHH of the nil Nash investment region N is colored grey
corresponding to initial production cost such that the Firms do not invest
and do not produce; dark blue corresponding to cases where the Firms do
not invest but Firm F1 produces a certain amount q1 greater than zero and
dark red corresponding to cases where the Firms do not invest but Firm F2
produces a certain amount q2 greater than zero.
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the new production costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)), with respect to the Nash investment
equilibrium (0, 0), are equal to the production costs (c1, c2).
The nil Nash investment region N is the union of four disjoint sets: the set
NLL consisting of all production costs that are low for both Firms (see Figure
2.25 (A)); the set NLH (resp. NHL) consisting of all production costs that are
low for Firm F1 (resp. F2) and high for Firm F2 (resp. F1) (see Figure 2.25 (B));
and the set NHH consisting of all production costs that are high for both Firms
(see Figure 2.25 (C)).
In this Subsection, we characterize the boundaries of these nil Nash invest-
ment regions. The boundaries of the nil Nash investment region NHH have been
characterized in the previous Subsection. The left boundary LeNHH of the nil
Nash investment region NHH coincides with the upper boundary of the single
monopoly region UMS1 (see Lemmas 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) and the lower boundary LNHH
of the nil Nash investment region NHH coincides with the upper boundary of the
single monopoly region UMS2 . To characterize all the other boundaries of the nil
Nash investment regions, we will use the following Theorems:
Let Ai, Ei, Fi, Gi and Hi be as in Theorem 2.4.1. Let us deﬁne the following
parameters:
• Ii = 4βiβj/λi; Ai = −2Ii
iβi; Ei = Ii
iγ;
• Gi = −Ii
iγcL; Fi = 2Ii
iβiαi + 2Ii
icLβi − Ii
iγαi;
• K = (4βiβj − γ2)2; Hi = −2Ii
icLβiαi + Ii
icLγαi −K.
Theorem 2.4.1 The solutions of ∂πi,D(0, 0; c1, c2)/∂vi = 0 are contained in
Aic
2
i + Eicicj + Fici +Gicj +Hi = 0.
2.4 FOP-Model boundary characterization 89
Proof: Let us compute
dπi,D
dvi
=
∂πi,D
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂aj
∂aj
∂vi
+
∂πi,D
∂vi
. (2.37)
We have that
∂πi,D
∂ai
= −4βiβj(2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
∂ai
∂vi
=
ηiλi
(λi + vi)2
∂πi,D
∂aj
= − 2βiγ(2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
∂πi,D
∂vi
= −1.
Hence, dπi,D/dvi = 0 if, and only if,
4βiβjηiλ(2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
λ2i
= K (2.38)
Taking ai = ci and aj = cj , we get that dπi,D/dvi = 0 if, and only if,
Iiηi(2βi(αi − ci) + γ(cj − αj))−K = 0
After algebric manipulations, we get
2Iiηiβiαi − 2Iiηiβici + Iiηiγcj − Iiηiγαi −K = 0
which leads to
Aic
2
i + Eicicj + Fici +Gicj +Hi = 0.

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Let Q = 
i(αi + cL) and R = −
iαicL − 2βiλi.
Theorem 2.4.2 The solution of ∂πi,Mi(0, 0; c1, c2)/∂vi = 0, is contained in
ci = (−Q+
√
Q2 − 4PR)/(−2
i). (2.39)
Proof: Let us compute
dπi,Mi
dvi
=
∂πi,Mi
∂ai
∂ai
∂vi
+
∂πi,Mi
∂vi
.
Since
∂πi,Mi(vi, 0; c1, c2)/∂vi = (
iλi(αi − ai)(ci − cL)) /
(
2βi(λi + vi)2
)− 1,
dπi,Mi(vi, 0; c1, c2)/dvi = 0 if, and only if,

iλi(αi − ai)(ci − cL) = 2βi(λi + vi)2.
Letting vi = 0 (ai = ci), we get

iλi(αi − ci)(ci − cL) = 2βiλ2i
that can be written as
−
iλic2i + 
iλi(αi + cL)ci − 
iλiαicL − 2βiλ2i = 0.
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Choose the positive solution, we get
ci = (−Q+
√
Q2 − 4PR)/(−2
i).

We begin by characterizing the boundary of the nil Nash investment region
NLL that is composed by a right boundary RNLL and a upper boundary UNLL .
The right boundary of the nil Nash investment region NLL (see Figure 2.25 (A))
is given by the curve (see Theorem 2.4.1 and Figure 2.26)
∂π1,D
∂v1
(0, 0; c1, c2) = 0.
Figure 2.26: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π1 of Firm F1 when
Firm F2 decides not to invest, i.e. π1,D(V1(0), 0; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ RNLL , the plot in blue
(I) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash
investment region NLL and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single recovery region S
R
1 .
Furthermore, the upper boundary of the region NLL is given by the curve (see
Theorem 2.4.1 and Figure 2.27)
∂π2,D
∂v2
(0, 0; c1, c2) = 0
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Figure 2.27: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π2 of Firm F2 when
Firm F1 decides not to invest, i.e. π2,M2(0, V2(0); c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ UNLL , the plot in blue
(I) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash
investment region NLL and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single recovery region S
R
2 .
We will refer to the boundaries of the region NLH as d1, d2, d3 and d4 (see Figure
2.25 (B)). The arc d1 is given by the curve (see Theorem 2.4.2 and Figure 2.28)
∂π1,M1
∂v1
(0, 0; c1, c2) = 0
The arc d2 is a segment line lM1 characterized in Lemma 2.2.2. The arc d2 is
described above. The arc d3 is given by the curve (see Theorem 2.4.1 and Figure
2.29)
∂π1,D
∂v1
(0, 0; c1, c2) = 0
and the arc d4 is given by the curve (see Theorem 2.4.1 and Figure 2.30)
∂π2,D
∂v2
(0, 0; c1, c2) = 0
2.4 FOP-Model boundary characterization 93
Figure 2.28: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π1 of Firm F1 when
Firm F2 decides not to invest, i.e. π1(V1(0), 0; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ d1, the plot in blue (I)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash
investment region NLH and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single favorable region S
F
1 .
Figure 2.29: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π1 of Firm F1 when
Firm F2 decides not to invest, i.e. π1,D(V1(0), 0; c1, c2). The plot in red (II)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ d3, the plot in blue (I)
corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash
investment region NLH and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair of
production costs (c1, c2) that are in the single favorable region S
F
1 .
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Figure 2.30: Each of the plots corresponds to the proﬁt π2 of Firm F2
when Firm F1 decides not to invest, i.e. π2,D(0, V2(0); c1, c2). The plot in
red (II) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) ∈ d4, the plot in
blue (I) corresponds to a pair of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the
single recovery region SR2 and the plot in green (III) corresponds to a pair
of production costs (c1, c2) that are in the nil Nash investment region NLH .
2.4.3 Competitive Nash investment region
The competitive Nash investment region C consists of all production costs (c1, c2)
such that there is a Nash investment equilibrium (v1, v2) with the property that
v1 > 0 and v2 > 0. Hence, the new production costs a1(v1) and a2(v2) of Firms
F1 and F2 are smaller than the actual production costs c1 and c2 of the Firms F1
and F2, respectively.
In Figure 2.31, the boundary of region C consists of four piecewise smooth
curves: The curve C1 is characterized by a1(v1) = c1 i.e. v1 = 0; the curve
C2 is characterized by a2(v2) = c2 i.e. v2 = 0; the curve C3 corresponds to
points (c1, c2) such that the new production costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)) have the pro-
perty that π1(a1, a2) = π1(a1, c2); and the curve C4 corresponds to points (c1, c2)
such that the Nash investment equilibrium (a1(v1), a2(v2)) has the property that
π1(a1, a2) = π1(c1, a2). The curve C2 (respectively C1) is the common boundary
between the competitive Nash investment region C and the single recovery region
SR2 (respectively S
R
1 ). The boundary C3 can be decomposed in three parts C
D
3 ,
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Figure 2.31: Firms’ investments in the competitive Nash investment region.
The competitive Nash investment region is colored green, the single Nash
investment region S1 (respectively S2) is colored blue (respectively red) and
the nil Nash investment region N is colored grey.
CB3 and C
M
3 . The boundary C
D
3 consists of all points in C3 between the points
P3 and E3 (see Figure 2.31). The boundary CD3 −{P3} has the property of being
contained in the lower boundary of the single duopoly region SD2 of Firm F2.
The boundary CB3 consists of all points in C3 between the points E3 and F3 (see
Figure 2.31). The boundary CB3 has the property of being contained in the lower
boundary of the single monopoly boundary region SB2 of Firm F2. The boundary
CM3 consists of all points in C3 between the points F3 and V (see Figure 2.31).
The boundary CM3 has the property of being contained in the lower boundary of
the single monopoly boundary region SB2 of Firm F2. Due to the symmetry, a
similar characterization holds for the boundary C4. The points P3, P4, Q and V
are the corners of the competitive Nash investment region C (see Figure 2.31).
The point Q is characterized by being in the intersection between the competitive
Nash investment region C and the nil Nash region NLL. The point P3 (respe-
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ctively P4) is characterized by being in the intersection between the competitive
Nash investment region C and the nil Nash investment region NHL (respectively
NLH). The point E3 in the boundary of the competitive Nash investment region
C is characterized by belonging to the boundaries of the single duopoly region
SD2 and the single monopoly boundary region S
B
2 (see Figure 2.31). The point
F3 in the boundary of the competitive Nash investment region C is characterized
by belonging to the boundaries of the single monopoly boundary region SB2 and
the single monopoly region SM2 (see Figure 2.31).
2.5 FOP-Model regions with multiple Nash
equilibria
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Figure 2.32: (A) Nash investment regions in the high production costs
region, ci ∈ [9, 10], with i = j; (B) Zoom of (A) in the region where there
are three Nash investment equilibria; (C)Dynamics on the production costs
in the high production costs region, ci ∈ [9, 10], with i = j: in blue, the
dynamics in the single Nash investment region for Firm F1, S1 where only
Firm F1 invests; in red the dynamics in the single Nash investment region
for Firm F2, S2 where only Firm F2 invests; and in green the dynamics in
the competitive Nash investment region C where both Firms invest.
Let us consider the region of high production costs, that can correspond to
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the production of new technologies, where there are multiple Nash investment
equilibria. Recall that Sci = R − Si and Cc = R − C. In this section, we
study the production costs that correspond to the existence of multiple Nash
investment equilibria. We ﬁnd a region SF1 ∩ SF2 ∩ C with a competitive Nash
investment equilibrium, a single favorable Nash investment equilibrium to Firm
F1 and a single favorable Nash investment equilibrium to Firm F2 (see Figure
2.35); a region SF1 ∩ SF2 ∩ Cc where there are, simultaneously, a single favorable
Nash investment equilibrium to Firm Fi and a single favorable Nash investment
equilibrium to Firm F2 (see Figure 2.33); and a region SFi ∩ C ∩ Scj , with i = j,
where there are two Nash investment equilibria, one favorable to Firm F1 and a
competitive one (see Figure 2.34).
This shows the high complexity of the R&D strategies of the Firms, for high
values of initial production costs.
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Figure 2.33: We ﬁx the initial production cost of Firm F1, c1 = 9.7 and
plot (A) the Nash investment equilibria (NIE) of Firm F1 and the Nash
investment equilibria of Firm F2; (B) the proﬁt of Firm F1 and the proﬁt
of Firm F2 where green means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the single
Nash investment region S1 and red means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to
the single Nash investment region S2.
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Figure 2.34: We ﬁx the initial production cost of Firm F1, c1 = 9.2 and
plot (A) the Nash investment equilibria (NIE) of Firm F1 and the Nash
investment equilibria of Firm F2; (B) the proﬁt of Firm F1 and the proﬁt of
Firm F2 where green means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the single Nash
investment region S1, red means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the single
Nash investment region S2 and blue means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to
the competitive Nash investment region C.
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Figure 2.35: We ﬁx the initial production cost of Firm F1, c1 = 9.35 and
plot (A) the Nash investment equilibria (NIE) of Firm F1 and the Nash
investment equilibria of Firm F2; (B) the proﬁt of Firm F1 and the proﬁt of
Firm F2 where green means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the single Nash
investment region S1, red means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the single
Nash investment region S2 and blue means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to
the competitive Nash investment region C.
2.6 FOP-Model R&D deterministic dynamics 99
2.6 FOP-Model R&D deterministic dynamics
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Figure 2.36: Dynamics on the production costs in terms of the initial pro-
duction costs (c1, c2): in blue, the dynamics in the single Nash investment
region for Firm F1, S1 where only Firm F1 invests; in red the dynamics in
the single Nash investment region for Firm F2, S2 where only Firm F2 in-
vests; and in green the dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region
C where both Firms invest.
The R&D deterministic dynamics on the production costs of the duopoly
competition appear from the Firms deciding to play a perfect Nash equilibrium
in the Cournot competition with R&D cost reduction investment programs, pe-
riod after period. The nil Nash investment region is the set of equilibria for these
dynamics. It is unusual in dynamical systems to have a non-isolated set of equili-
brium points. We notice that we have a single Nash investment region coexisting
with a competition Nash investment region, and we have the single Nash invest-
ment regions for both Firms coexisting with the competitive Nash investment
region. This is due to the complex investment structure that we have to deal in
these problems. For simplicity, we will study, separately, the R&D deterministic
dynamics in the competitive, in the single and in the nil Nash investment regions,
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using the corresponding Nash investment equilibrium.
The R&D deterministic dynamics in the single Nash investment region is
implicitly determined by Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. Let S1 = SF1 ∪ SR1 be the
single Nash investment region of Firm F1. If (c1, c2) ∈ SF1 , then only Firm F1
invests along the time. Furthermore, at some period of time, the pair of new
production costs falls in the monopoly region and so Firm F2 is driven out of the
market by Firm F1. The production costs approach, along the time, the region
NLH (see Figure 2.36). Hence, the production costs of Firm F1 approach low
costs of production but the production costs of Firm F2 are always ﬁxed at high
production costs. If (c1, c2) ∈ SR1 then only Firm F1 invests along the time. So,
Firm F1 will recover, along the time, from its disadvantageous position. The
production costs approach, along the time, the nil Nash investment region NLL
(see Figure 2.36). Hence Firm F1 is able to recover, along the time, to the region
where both Firms have low production costs.
The R&D deterministic dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region
is implicitly determined by Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. In the competitive Nash
investment region both Firms invest, along the time, and the production costs
converge to the nil Nash investment region NLL. Hence, the production costs
of both Firms are driven by the R&D deterministic dynamics to low production
costs.
When the production costs are high (see Section 2.5) we have regions with
multiple Nash investment equilibria. In the region RS1∩S2 , the Firm that decides
to invest in the ﬁrst period can drive the other Firm out of the Market, and its
production costs will approach, along the time, low production costs either in
the nil Nash investment region NLH or in the nil Nash investment region NHL.
Hence, the short and long term economical outcome for the Firms can depend
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only upon the R&D investment decision of both Firms at period one. In Figure
2.37, we observe that for some production cost c2, the Firms face two possible
dynamics depending on which of the two possible equilibria S1 or S2 they decide
to choose. In the region RSi∩C , with i = j, if both Firms decide to implement
their R&D cost reduction investment programs according to the Nash investment
strategy in the competitive Nash investment region C, both Firms will stay in the
market, along the time, and their production costs will approach low production
costs. However, if one of the Firms decides not to invest in period one, this Firm
can be driven out of the Market and the production costs of the other Firm will
approach, along the time, low production costs. In Figure 2.38, we observe that
for some production cost c2, the Firms face two possible dynamics depending
on which of the two possible equilibria S1 or C decide to choose. Finally, in
Figure 2.39 we see that for some production cost c2, the Firms face three possible
dynamics depending on which of the three possible equilibria S1 or C or S2 decide
to choose.
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Figure 2.37: Plot of the New production cost (NPC) of Firm F1 and the
New production cost of Firm F2 with the initial production cost of Firm F1
c1 = 9.7 ﬁxed where green means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the single
Nash investment region S1 and red means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to
the single Nash investment region S2.
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Figure 2.38: Plot of the New production cost (NPC) of Firm F1 and the
New production cost of Firm F2 with the initial production cost of Firm
F1 c1 = 9.2 ﬁxed where green means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the
single Nash investment region S1, red means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to
the single Nash investment region S2 and blue means that the pair (c1, c2)
belongs to the competitive Nash investment region C.
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Figure 2.39: Plot of the New production cost (NPC) of Firm F1 and the
New production cost of Firm F2 with the initial production cost of Firm
F1 c1 = 9.35 ﬁxed where green means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to the
single Nash investment region S1, red means that the pair (c1, c2) belongs to
the single Nash investment region S2 and blue means that the pair (c1, c2)
belongs to the competitive Nash investment region C.
2.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we presented R&D deterministic dynamics on the production
costs of Cournot competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of R&D invest-
ment strategies of the Firms at every period. The following conclusions are valid
in some parameter region of our model. We introduced a new R&D investment
function inspired by the logistic equation and found all Perfect Nash investment
equilibria of the Cournot competition model with R&D cost reduction investment
programs.
We described four main economic regions corresponding to distinct perfect
Nash equilibria: a competitive Nash investment region C where both Firms in-
vest, a single Nash investment region for Firm F1, S1, where only Firm F1 invests,
a single Nash investment region for Firm F2, S2, where only Firm F2 invests, and
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a nil Nash investment region N where neither of the Firms invest. For the FOP-
Model these four Nash investment regions appear whereas for the AJ-Model we
only ﬁnd three diﬀerent Nash investment equilibria regions: a competitive Nash
investment region C, a single Nash investment region S1 for Firm F1 and a single
Nash investment region S2 for Firm F2. The non existence of nil Nash invest-
ment region N has to do with the shape of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s R&D
cost reduction investment function that reﬂects an higher incentive to invest. For
the FOP-Model, the nil Nash investment region has four subregions: NLL, NLH ,
NHL and NHH . The single Nash investment region can be divided into four sub-
regions: the single favorable region for Firm F1, SF1 , the single recovery region
for Firm F1, SR1 , the single favorable region for Firm F2, S
F
2 , the single recovery
region for Firm F2, SR2 . The single favorable region S
F
1 (due to the symmetry
the same characterization holds for SF2 ) is the union of three disjoint regions: the
single duopoly region SD1 where the production costs, after the investments, be-
long to the duopoly region D; the single monopoly boundary region SB1 where the
production costs, after the investments, belong to the boundary of the monopoly
region lM1 ; and the single monopoly region S
M
1 where the production costs, after
the investments, belong to the monopoly region M1.
We showed the existence of regions where the Nash investment equilibria are
not unique: the intersection RS1∩S2 between the single Nash investment region S1
and the single Nash investment region S2 is non empty; the intersection RSi∩C ,
with between the single Nash investment region Si and the competitive Nash
investment region C is non empty; the intersection RS1∩C∩S2 between the sin-
gle Nash investment region S1, the single Nash investment region S2 and the
competitive Nash investment region C is non empty.
In Section 2.6, we presented, for the FOP-Model, the R&D deterministic dy-
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namics on the production costs of Cournot competitions, based on R&D invest-
ment strategies of the Firms and we illustrated the transients and the asymptotic
limits of the R&D deterministic dynamics on the production costs. We introduced
the implicit equations (see Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) determining the R&D de-
terministic dynamics that are distinct in the competitive Nash investment region
C and in the single Nash investment regions S1 and S2. The nil Nash investment
region N determines the set of all production costs that are ﬁxed by the dyna-
mics and thus is the set of equilibria for the R&D deterministic dynamics. The
nil Nash investment regions NLL, NHL and NLH will appear as the asymptotic
production costs for both Firms depending upon their R&D investment strate-
gies. The single Nash investment region Si determines the set of production costs
where the production cost of Firm Fj is constant, along the time, and only the
production cost of Firm Fi evolves. We saw that if (c1, c2) belongs to the single
favorable Nash investment region SF1 (respectively S
F
2 ), then only Firm F1 (res-
pectively Firm F2) invests along the time. The production costs approach, along
the time, the region NLH (respectively NHL). On the other hand, we observed
that if (c1, c2) belongs to the single recovery Nash investment region SR1 (res-
pectively SR2 ) then only Firm F1 (respectively Firm F2) invests along the time.
Hence, Firm Fi is able to recover, along the time, from its disadvantageous po-
sition approaching the region where both Firms have low production costs NLL.
The R&D deterministic dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region C
lead both Firms, along the time, to approach the nil Nash investment region NLL
corresponding to a case where both Firms have low production costs.
Interestingly, for high initial production costs, that can correspond to the
production of new technologies, the single favorable regions of both Firms and
the competitive Nash investment region have non-empty intersection. Hence,
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in this region, depending upon the Nash investment strategy chosen from the
three possible Nash investment equilibria, the time evolution of the production
costs will approach three distinct economic equilibria regions called NLL, NLH
and NHL. Hence, our analysis showed that in the case of production of new
technologies, corresponding to high initial production costs, the R&D investment
strategies chosen by both Firms are essential for their maintenance in the market.
This also shows that the market can be driven, in a short period of time to a
monopoly situation.
Chapter 3
Edgeworthian Economies
Models
3.1 Introduction
The work presented in this Chapter is joint work with B.F. Finkensta¨dt, B.
Oliveira, A.A. Pinto and A.N. Yannacopoulos and most of it is contained in the
research article [27], in the conference proceedings [24], [25], [26], [33] and [56]
and in the book chapter [28].
In most economies three basic activities occur: production, exchange and
consumption. We analyze the case of a pure exchange economy where individuals
trade their goods in the market place for mutual advantage. We present models
of an Edgeworthian exchange economy where two goods are traded in a market
place.
In Section 3.3 we show that for a speciﬁc class of random matching Edgewor-
thian economies, the expectation of the limiting equilibrium price coincides with
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that of related Walrasian economies.
In Sections 3.7 and 3.8 two new modiﬁcations to the model are introduced.
In both these models, participants do not necessarily trade according to their
bilateral Walras equilibrium price. We associate to each participant either a low
or high bargaining skill factor bringing up a game alike the “prisioner’s dilemma”.
The exact location in the core where the trade takes place is decided by both
participants’ bargaining skills. If a more skilled participant meets a less skilled
participant, trade occurs with an advantage to the more skilled bargainer (see
Section 3.7). However, if both participants are too skilled, they are penalized by
not being allowed to trade. If the pair randomly chosen to trade is formed by
two low skilled bargainers, they will trade according to the usual bilateral Walras
equilibrium price.
We analyze the eﬀect of the participants’s bargaining skills in the variation
of their utilities. Finally, in Section 3.8, we let the bargaining skills of the par-
ticipants evolve, along the trades, according to two predeﬁned rules and analyse
how these bargaining skills evolve depending on these rules.
3.2 The Edgeworth model and some necessary
results
We consider agents with preferences i that can be described by Cobb-Douglas
type utility functions Ui(xi, yi) = xαii y
1−αi
i .
Assume the following model for an exchange economy with 2 durable goods.
Out of an initial collection of agents we pick N agents, through a sampling scheme
with or without replacement.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is a model which is so well rooted in eco-
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nomic theory that its use hardly needs to be justiﬁed. As stated in the excellent
review paper of Lloyd [45] the Cobb-Douglas function has been around for ages,
even well before its formal statement by Cobb and Douglas, and its roots are
inherent in the works of Mill, Pareto, Wicksell, Von Thu¨nen, etc, and for var-
ious reasons serves as the standard test bed for a great number of studies in
mathematical economics. One of these reasons is its mathematical simplicity,
which however, captures important theoretical issues such as constant maximal
rate of substitution etc. However, this is not the sole reason for its generali-
zed use. Recent results of Voorneveld [80] show that the utility function being
of the Cobb-Douglas form is equivalent to the preferences of the agents having
the property of strict monotonicity, homotheticity in each coordinate and upper
semicontinuity. These properties are rather generic properties for the preferences,
which can be seen as very reasonable modelling assumptions. Furthermore, there
is empirical evidence [62], according to which with very large and increasing per
capita income the utility function becomes asymptotically indistinguishable from
Cobb-Douglas. These very interesting results shed new light on the Cobb-Douglas
utility function and provides further justiﬁcation for its use as a standard model,
apart from its apparent analytical simplicity.
Then these agents, at subsequent time instants, meet randomly in pairs and
exchange goods so that their utility levels are maximized. When the pair (i, j)
meets, they trade at the bilateral equilibrium price p which is given by
p =
αi yi + αj yj
(1− αi)xi + (1− αj)xj (3.1)
and their demands in the two goods (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) are such that the utili-
ties of the agents are maximized under the constraints available as if only these
two agents were participating in the market. The bilateral equilibrium price,
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determines the unique point in the core such that the market “locally” clears. In
some sense, the agents behave in a myopic way, interacting only in pairs, and not
forseeing the future interactions or keeping memory of their past encounters.
The randomness of the encounters introduces some randomness into this mar-
ket. The agents start with a set of initial endowments (xi(0), yi(0)), then they
trade in random pairs and after the t trade they end up with a consumption
bundle (xi(t), yi(t)) which are traded in the bilateral equilibrium price p(t), given
by the formula (3.1) with xi, xj , yi, yj substituted by xi(t − 1), xj(t − 1), yi(t −
1), yj(t−1). On each trade only two randomly chosen agents i, j exchange goods,
and the consumption bundles of all the other agents k = i, j remain unchanged,
i.e. (xk(t − 1), yk(t − 1)) = (xk(t), yk(t)). On account of the random pairing of
the agents, the demand of the agents on the two goods is a stochastic process,
and that turns the price p(t) into a stochastic process as well.
An interesting question that arises in this context is the following:
Does there exist a limiting price p∞ = limt→∞ p(t) and if so how
would that compare to the Walrasian equilibrium price, where all
agents meet at once and trade in one go?
An answer to the ﬁrst question has been given by a number of authors, see
for example [36] and references therein. According to this bibliography, p∞ exists
almost surely, and it is a random variable. However, it depends on the actual
game of the play, that is the exact order of the random pairing of the agents.
The aim of the present work is to provide some results on the expectation
of this random variable p∞, and how this compares to the Walrasian price. In
particular, under some rather general symmetry conditions on the initial endow-
ments of the agents and distribution of initial preferences, we show that the
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expectation of the logarithm of p∞ equals the logarithm of the Walrasian price
for the same initial endowments of the agents. This is an interesting result, in the
sense that even though the agents meet and trade myopically in random pairs,
they somehow “self-organize” and the expected limiting price equals that of a
market where a central planner announces prices and all the agents conform to
them through utility maximization, as happens in the Walrasian model.
The main reason why organizing behavior is observed is the symmetry in the
endowments and preferences of the agents that, as will become clear from our
analysis in the next section, poses global constraints in the market, in the sense
that it enforces each agents to have a mirror, or a dual agent.
3.3 The main result
We introduce the concept of duality in the market.
We assume that the collection of agents is completely characterized by their
preferences α, and their endowments (x, y) in the 2 goods. We may deﬁne a
probability distribution function on (α, x, y) space, f(α, x, y) which provides the
probability that a chosen agent has preferences in (α, α + dα) × (x, x + dx) ×
(y, y + dy). We assume that the probability distribution has compact support,
and the support in (x, y) is bounded away from zero.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1 We say that a market satisﬁes the p - statistical duality
condition if the probability function has the symmetry property
f(α, x, y) = f
(
1− α, y
p
, p x
)
where p ∈ R.
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The p-statistical duality property means that each agent with characteristics
(α, x, y) has a mirror agent with characteristics (1 − α, y/p, p x) with the same
probability under f . The class of probability functions f(α, x, y) of the form
f1(α)f2(x, y) with the property that f1(α) = f1(1−α) and f2(x, y) = f2(y/p, p x)
satisﬁes the p-statistical duality. A common probability function f2, satisfying
the above condition, is the uniform distribution. Another common example of a
probability function satisfying the p-statistical duality is used in Corollary 3.3.1,
below, and determines the most well known matching technology used in random
matching games with N agents.
Statistical duality guarantees that the prices observed in the random matching
Edgeworthian economy coincide in expectation with those of the Walrasian eco-
nomy. For each collection of agents, let pw denote the Walrasian equilibrium
price of the market.
Theorem 3.3.1 Assume a market consisting of a ﬁnite number N of agents,
such that p-statistical duality holds for the initial endowments, then
E[ln(p(t)] = E¯[ln(pw)] = ln(p), for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,+∞}.
Furthermore,
E[ln(p∞)] = ln(p)
where E¯ is the expectation over the distribution of agents and E is expectation
over the distribution of agents and over all possible runs of the game.
In Theorem 3.3.1, the advantage of using the logarithm of the price is that if we
consider the other good to be the enumeraire, the absolute value of the logarithm
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of the price keeps the same and just the sign of the value of the logarithm of the
price changes.
A relevant and well known example of an economy with the p-statistical
duality property is an economy where with probability 1 we start with a sample
of N = 2M agents where M agents have characteristics (ai, xi, yi), i = 1, · · · ,M ,
and the remaining M agents have characteristics (ai+M , xi+M , yi+M ) = (1 −
ai, yi/p, p xi), i = 1, · · · ,M . In other words, in this economy, each agent has
a dual agent, i.e. agent i is dual to agent i + M where i = 1, · · · ,M . This
corresponds to choosing f to consist of 2M Dirac masses and choosing N agents
out an initial collection of N .
Corollary 3.3.1 Assume a market consisting of a ﬁnite number N = 2M of
agents, such that M agents have characteristics (ai, xi, yi), i = 1, · · · ,M , and the
remaining M agents have characteristics (ai+M , xi+M , yi+M ) = (1−ai, yi/p, p xi),
i = 1, · · · ,M , then
E[ln(p(t)] = ln(pw) = ln(p), for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,+∞}.
Furthermore,
E[ln(p∞)] = ln(p)
where E is the expectation over all possible runs of the game.
Proof: The distribution function f consists of 2M Dirac masses and satisﬁes the
p-statistical duality because every agent has a dual.

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The theorem can also be shown to hold for a generalized random matching
economy in which agents do not only meet in pairs. In this game, we initially pick
N agents and then for each trading date we pick randomly M ≤ N agents, that
decide to trade on the competitive price for the local market consisting only of
these M agents. The number M , may change with t. Then, under our statistical
duality condition, it may be shown that the stated result holds.
3.4 Beyond the p-statistical duality
We consider an example of an economy where with probability 1 we start with
a sample of N = 2M agents where M agents are of type A with characteristics
(αA, xA, yA), and the remaining M agents are of type B and have characteristics
(αB, xB, yB). For simplicity, we consider that the initial endowments of the two
goods are xi = yi = 1/N for all agents. In other words, in this economy, each
agent has a dual agent, i.e. agents of type A are dual to agent of type B. This
corresponds to choosing f , in deﬁnition 3.3.1, to consist of 2M Dirac masses
and choosing the agents out an initial collection of N . Hence, letting pA,Bw be
the Walrasian equilibrium price of the market, we observe that the expected
value E[ln(pA,B∞ )] over the distribution of agents is equal to ln(pA,B∞ ). Let pA,B∞ =
limt→∞ p(t) be the limiting price, for a given run of the game, where p(t) is the
bilateral equilibrium price at trade t. Our object of study is the value dαA,αB =
E[ln(pA,B∞ )] − ln(pA,Bw ) where E[ln(pA,B∞ )] is the expectation over all runs of the
game.
In Figure 3.1, we consider the simple case where dα = dα−0.25,α+0.25 and
α ∈]0, 1[. The p-statistical duality holds for α = 0.5 giving d0.5 = 0.We observe
that when we deviate α from 0.5, breaking the p-statistical duality, the value of
dα varies continuously with α. Furthermore, for values of α close to 0.5, dα looks
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as a contact with order greater than one to the horizontal line at 0. Hence, these
numerical results give evidence that Theorem 3.3.1 is robust in the sense that
dαA,αB is small for small deviations from the p-statistical duality.
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Figure 3.1: The horizontal line, in red, corresponds to d = 0. (A) The error
bar is, as usual, centered in the mean and the upper (resp. lower) limit is
the mean plus (resp. minus) the standard deviation; (B) The error bar is
centered in the mean and the upper (resp. lower) limit is the mean plus
(resp. minus) the standard deviation over the square root of the number of
runs (100).
3.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
The proof uses the following lemma which follows from Proposition 3, Chapter 1
of [36].
Lemma 3.5.1 There exists a random variable p∞(ω) such that
lim
t→∞ p(t, ω) = p∞(ω), a.s. (3.2)
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where by ω we denote a particular realization of the game, that is an initial choice
of N agents and the subsequent random pair matchings.
To facilitate the presentation of the proof of Theorem 3.3.1 we need the following
notation.
We will identify an agent Ai at time t, hereafter denoted by Ai(t), with the
triple (αi, xi(t), yi(t)) consisting of her preference and her consumption bundle at
time t.
We say that agent Ai at time t, which we will hereafter denote by Ai(t) is dual
to agent Aj(t) at time t, if αj = 1− αi and (xi(t), yi(t)) = (yj(t)/p, p xj(t)). We
denote that by A¯i(t) = Aj(t).
The initial choice of agents is a random event which will be denoted by ωA. We
can deﬁne the random variable A(ωA) = {A1, A2, · · · , AN} which is the initial
choice of agents that will participate in the market.
Having initially chosen the group of agents A = {A1, · · · , AN}, denote by ωr
the inﬁnite sequence of pairs ωr = (ωr(1), ωr(2), · · · ) where ωr(t) is the pair
(i(t), j(t)), i(t) = j(t), corresponding to the pair of agents (Ai(t), Aj(t)) that have
been randomly chosen to trade at time t.
A full run of the game is the sequence ωAωr that is an initial choice of agents and
an inﬁnite sequence of random matchings. A ﬁnite time run of the game is the se-
quence ωAωr |t where ωr |t is the restriction of ωr for the ﬁrst t random matchings.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1: Suppose that we have two initial sets of agents
A = {A1, A2, · · · , AN} and B = {B1, · · · , BN}, such that every agent Bi = A¯i is
the dual agent of Ai. Choose a run of the play ωr. After each trade t + 1, the
consumption bundles of the agents (i, j) that have exchanged will be given by
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the following formulae
xi(t+ 1) = αi
(
yi(t)
pij(t)
+ xi(t)
)
(3.3)
yi(t+ 1) = (1− αi) (pij(t)xi(t) + yi(t) )
and similarly for j where
pij(t) =
αi yi(t) + αj yj(t)
(1− αi)xi(t) + (1− αj)xj(t) .
We observe from (3.3) that, if ω(t) = (i(t), j(t)) and (A¯i(t−1)(t − 1), A¯j(t−1)(t −
1)) = (Bi(t−1)(t− 1), Bj(t−1)(t− 1)) then
(A¯i(t)(t), A¯j(t)(t)) = (Bi(t)(t), Bj(t)(t)) . (3.4)
That means that the random dynamical system deﬁned by equations (3.3) is
equivariant under the duality transformation.
By statistical duality, for each run of the economy ω := ωAωr we have a dual
run ω¯ := ωA¯ωr with the same probability P (ωAωr |t) = P (ωBωr |t). Therefore,
by (3.4), the statistical duality is invariant over time. Again, by (3.4), we obtain
that
ln(p(ωAωr |t)) + ln(p(ωBωr |t)) = 2 ln(p) (3.5)
which implies, by statistical duality, that E[ln(p(t, ω))] = ln(p), for all t ∈ N.
Observe that equation (3.5) reﬂects the invariance of the maximal rate of substi-
tution for dual pairings.
Consider now the Walrasian price pW for the initial choice of agents A. In
this case, we assume that all agents trade simultaneously in one time step. The
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Walrasian price is given by the formula
pW =
∑N
i=1 αi yi∑N
i=1(1− αi)xi
.
Taking logarithms in this formula and averaging over all possible choices of the
initial agents, we obtain that statistical duality implies that E¯[ln(pW )] = ln(p).
Let us now consider the case where t = ∞. There exists a constant K ≥ 0
such that for all t, we have that | ln(p(t, ω)) |≤ K almost surely. The boundendess
of the price follows from the assumption that all the distribution of endowments
for the agents has compact support which is bounded away from 0 for all t. Then
by a direct application of Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem we have
that
E
[
lim
t→∞ ln(p(t, ω))
]
= lim
t→∞E [ln(p(t, ω))] = E[ln(p∞(ω))]
from which follows that
E[ln(p∞(ω)] = E¯[ln(pW )] = ln(p)
This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
3.6 An extension to Arrow-Debreu economies
The results presented may have an interesting extension to the study of economies
in the presence of uncertainty, within the framework of the Arrow-Debreu model.
Consider a economy with uncertainty, in which two states of the world are
possible. Only one of these states may occur in each time instance, with proba-
bility (α, 1 − α), respectively. In this model we consider good 1 and good 2 as
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consumption levels of a single consumption good at each state of the world. We
allow each agent to have her own personalized view concerning probability the
occurence of future states of the world.
Consider that agents, make their decisions according to an expected utility
function of the logarithmic form,
E[ln(C)] = α ln(x) + (1− α) ln(y)
where C = (x, y) is now the random variable that describes consumption at
diﬀerent states of the world.
Notice, the formal similarity of the above model with that of the logarithm
of the Cobb-Douglas function with two physical goods. Within the context of
the present Arrow-Debreu type model, the preferences α of the agents have to
be interpreted as personalized views concerning the probability of occurence of
the diﬀerent states of the world, whereas the two goods have to be interpreted
as consumption levels of the same physical good, in diﬀerent states of the world.
The concept of statistical duality makes sense here, if interpreted as follows: For
every agent having a certain idea about the probability of occurence of the future
states of the world, there is a mirror agent, having the opposite ideas about
them, as well as a “reﬂected” and properly dilated initial endowment, providing
her the ability to consume in diﬀerent states of the world. This spread in ideas
about states of the world, reﬂects in some way the absence of information in the
economy. Therefore, this model may be a good model for markets in which there
is no clear idea concerning the future states of the world that are about to emerge.
As such it may provide a good model for markets where there is not enough data
on which a detailed study that will allow us to predict the probability of future
states can be based. Theorem 3.3.1 is directly applicable for this model. The
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consequences of the theorem are interesting. For instance, one may conclude that
in this model, the eﬀect of the symmetry is to make the market converge to some
Walrasian equilibrium, out of which an “average” Arrow-Debreu measure may be
extracted, which depends on the statistics of the views of each agent, concerning
the states of the world, as well as on the initial endowments. Therefore, the
model may allow some understanding of the dynamics, of how beliefs survive and
propagate through the market, and may serve as a paradigm for evolutionary
ﬁnance.
3.7 Trade deviating from the bilateral Wal-
ras equilibrium
The model with trade deviating from bilateral equilibrium is similar to the Edge-
worth model. The diﬀerence is that, in this model, we introduce a new parameter
gi ∈ {0, 1} representing the bargaining skill of each participant. If two less skilled
gi = gj = 0 participants meet they will trade in the point of the core determined
by their bilateral Walras equilibrium price, as in the Edgeworth model. However,
if a more skilled participant gi = 1 meets a less skilled gi = 0 participant, they
will trade in a point of the core between the point determined by their bilateral
Walras equilibrium price and the interception of the core with the indiﬀerence
curve of the less skilled participant, as can be seen in Figure 3.2 traducing an
advantage to the more skilled participant. Finally, if both participants are highly
skilled gi = gj = 1 they are penalized by not being able to trade. This is similar
to the “prisoner’s dilemma”, where two non cooperative players are penalized,
a non cooperative player has a better payoﬀ than a cooperative player, and two
cooperative players have a better payoﬀ than when they meet a non cooperative
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player but still worse than the payoﬀ of the non cooperative player.
x
y
E
Oj
Oi
D
A
Figure 3.2: Edgeworth Box with the indiﬀerence curves for the more skilled
participant i (blue curve) and for the less skilled participant j (green curve).
The red curve is the core and the red dots represent the contract curve. The
slope of the pink segment line is the bilateral Walras equilibrium price. The
slope of the black segment line is a price that gives advantage to the more
skilled participant. The interception point D of the black line with the core
indicates the ﬁnal allocations from the trade deviating from the bilateral
Walras equilibrium. The point E indicates the initial endowments.
We study the eﬀect of the bargaining skills in the increase of the value of the
utility of the participants. Let the variation of the utility function of a participant
uf − u0 be the diﬀerence between the limit value of the utility function and the
initial value of the utility function. We present, in Figure 3.3, two cumulative
distribution functions of the variation of the utility functions one corresponding
to the less skilled participants (black) and the other corresponding to the more
skilled participants (red). This function indicates the proportion of participants
that have variations of the utility function less than or equal to its argument.
In Figure 3.3 (A) there are 20% of highly skilled participants. We observe that
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the median of the variation of the utility function is higher for the more skilled
participants. On the other hand, in Figure 3.3 (B) there are 80% of highly
skilled participants, and we observe that the median of the variation of the utility
function is lower for the more skilled participants. We notice that the strategy
followed the minority is the one that provides a higher median variation in the
utility function.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative distribution function of the variation of the utility
(deﬁned as uf − u0) for the less skilled participants (black) and for the
more skilled participants (red). (A) Simulation with 20% of highly skilled
participants and 80% of less skilled participants; (B) Simulation with 80%
of highly skilled participants and 20% of less skilled participants.
3.8 Evolution of the bargaining skills
In this Section, at each iteration, a random pair of participants (i, j) is chosen
with trade occurring deviating from the bilateral Walras equilibrium price (as
in the previous Section). In this Section we consider that the bargaining skill
g is a continuous variable, where higher values mean better bargaining skills.
Without loss of generality we can consider that gi ≥ gj . We impose that trade
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only occurs if gi + gj ≤ 1 and gi − gj ∈ [0, 1]. The pair trades to the point in
the core determined by the price pg = ηp + (1 − η)mj where p is the bilateral
Walras equilibrium price, η = gi − gj and mj is the maximum price at which the
participant j accepts to trade determined by the interception of the core with
the indiﬀerence curve of participant j . After the trade we allow evolution on
the bargaining skills of the participants according to two distinct rules: a) the
bargaining skills of the participants increase if they were not able to trade and
decreases if they were able to trade; b) the bargaining skills of the participants
decreases if they were not able to trade and increases otherwise. In case a) if
the sum of their bargaining skills is above a cut point, the participants are not
allowed to trade and both participants bargaining skills are increased. Otherwise,
if the sum of their bargaining skills is below the cut point, the participants will be
allowed to trade with advantage to the more skilled participant. After the trade,
the bargaining skills of both participants decrease. In this case we observe (see
Figure 3.4 (A)) that the participants bargaining skills converge to one of two limit
values (close to 0 or close to 1). In case b) if the sum of their bargaining skills is
above a cut point, the participants are not allowed to trade and their bargaining
skills are decreased. Otherwise, if the sum of their bargaining skills is below the
cut point, the participants will be allowed to trade with advantage to the more
skilled participant. After the trade, the bargaining skills of both participants
increase. In this case (see Figure 3.4 (B)) we observe that the bargaining skills
converge to one limit value (close to 1/2).
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Figure 3.4: Variation of the bargaining skills with time. (A) The bargain-
ing skills decrease when trade is allowed and increase otherwise; (B) The
bargaining skills increase when trade is allowed and decrease otherwise.
3.9 Conclusions
In this Chapter we have proven that, under symmetry conditions, prices in a
random exchange economy with two goods, where the agents preferences are
characterized by the Cobb-Douglas utility function, converge to the Walrasian
price. In Section 3.7 we associate a bargaining skill to each participant which
brings up a game alike the Prisoner’s Dilemma. When we considered a group
of less skilled bargainers and a group of more skilled bargainers, the group in
minority has a higher median increase in the value of the utilities. In Section 3.8
we studied the possibility of the participants adapting their bargaining skills along
the time. We considered two distinct evolutionary rules: when the bargaining
skills decrease with the trade, the bargaining skills of the participants converge,
in time, to one of two possible limit values; when the bargaining skills increase
with trade, we observe that the bargaining skills converge, in time, to a single
intermediate value.
Chapter 4
Immune Response Models
4.1 Introduction
The work presented in this Chapter is joint work with N.J. Burroughs, B. Oliveira
and A.A. Pinto and most of it is contained in the research articles [13], [14] and
[15] and in the book chapter [32].
We analyse the eﬀect of the Regulatory T cells (Tregs) in the local control
of the immune responses by T cells. We study the model presented in [11]. We
obtain an explicit formula for the level of antigenic stimulation of T cells as a
function of the concentration of T cells and the parameters of the model. The
relation between the concentration of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of T
cells is an hysteresis, that is unfold for some parameter values. We study the
appearance of autoimmunity from cross-reactivity between a pathogen and a self
antigen or from bystander proliferation. We also study an asymmetry in the
death rates. Under this asymmetry we show that the antigenic stimulation of
Tregs is able to control locally the population size of Tregs. Other eﬀects of this
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asymmetry are a faster immune response and an improvement in the simulations
of the bystander proliferation. The rate of variation of the levels of antigenic
stimulation determines if the outcome is an immune response or if Tregs are
able to maintain control due to the presence of a transcritical bifurcation for
some tuning between the antigenic stimuli of T cells and Tregs. This behavior is
explained by the presence of a transcritical bifurcation.
4.1.1 Immune response model
There are a number of diﬀerent (CD4) T cell regulatory phenotypes reported; we
study a model of Tregs, which are currently identiﬁed as CD25+ T cells, although
this is not a deﬁnitive molecular marker. At a genetic level, these Tregs express
Foxp3, a master regulator of the Treg phenotype inducing CD25, CTLA-4 and
GITR expression, all correlating with a suppressive phenotype [68].
Figure 4.1: Model schematic showing growth, death and phenotype transi-
tions of the Treg populations R,R∗, and autoimmune T cell T, T ∗ popula-
tions. Cytokine dynamics are not shown: IL-2 is secreted by activated T
cells T ∗ and adsorbed by all the T cell populations equally.
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We model a population of Tregs (denoted R,R∗) and conventional T cells
(T ,T ∗) with processes shown schematically in Figure 4.1. Both populations re-
quire antigenic stimulation for activation, Tregs being activated by self antigens.
Levels of antigenic stimulation are denoted a and b for Tregs and conventional
T cells respectively. On activation conventional T cells both secrete IL-2 and
acquire proliferative capacity in the presence of IL-2 while Tregs proliferate in
the presence of IL-2, although less eﬃciently than normal T cells [74], and they
do not secrete IL-2. Activated Tregs suppress IL-2 secretion [74] thereby inhibi-
ting T cell growth. However, if IL-2 is present (CD4) T cells can still proliferate
[68, 69]. In the model we assume that T cells activated by exposure to their
speciﬁc antigen have a cytokine secreting state (a normal activated state) and a
non secreting state to which they revert at a constant rate k. Thus in absence of
antigen growth halts. Tregs also induce a transition to the (inhibited) nonsecre-
ting state and this transition rate is assumed proportional to the Treg population
density. This transition can either be through direct cell:cell contact or be in-
duced by soluble inhibitors [68], both of which give identical mass action kinetics
over suitable density ranges. T cells regain secretion status on CD28 coreceptor
stimulation [76], which we assume correlates with antigen exposure through an
increased conjugate formation rate. Thus in the presence of costimulation and
Tregs, the T cell population would be a mixture of partially inhibited, and normal
T cells. Although we assume an antigen dependent rate of secretion inhibition
reversion, similar results would be obtained with a constant reversion rate, i.e.
if costimulation exposure is independent of antigen density. Note that exoge-
nous IL-2 does not reverse the suppressed phenotype, i.e. secretion status is not
reacquired on cell proliferation [76].
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Regulatory T cells are assumed to be in homeostasis, thus Treg density is con-
trolled through some type of (nonlinear) competition. Homeostatic mechanisms
of Tregs are currently poorly understood. In [11] it is used a generic mechanism
that utilizes a cytokine (denoted J), analogous to interleukine 7 which is known to
homeostatically regulate memory T cells [70]. We assume the cytokine is secreted
by the local tissues, thereby sustaining a local population of Tregs activated by
a probably tissue speciﬁc proﬁle of self antigens. Tregs compete for this cytokine
by adsorption and thus population homeostasis is achieved.
In Section 4.3 we discuss an asymmetry in the model where we assume that
the secreting T cells T ∗ have a lower death rate than the non secreting T cells
T and that the active Tregs R∗ also have a lower death rate than inactive Tregs
R [13]. We also consider an inﬂow Rinput of tregs instead of the J cytokine
(both mechanisms yield similar results). This asymmetry in the death rates and
the inﬂow Rinput of Tregs allow the antigenic stimulation a of Tregs to regulate
the size of the local population of Tregs. We also include a growth limitation
mechanism and we use a (quadratic) Fas-FasL death mechanism [52], that is
assumed to act on all T cells equally. Results will be similar with any saturation
mechanism. Finally, we include an inﬂux of (auto) immune T cells into the tissue
(Tinput in cells per ml per day), which can represent T cell circulation or naive T
cell input from the thymus.
A set of ordinary diﬀerential equations is employed to study the dynamics,
with a compartment for each T cell population (inactive Tregs R, active Tregs
R∗, non secreting T cells T , secreting activated T cells T ∗), interleukine 2 density
I and the homeostatic Treg cytokine J ,
dR
dt
= (
ρ(I+J)−β(R +R∗ + T + T ∗)− dˆ)R + kˆ(R∗ − aR),
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dR∗
dt
= (
ρ(I+J)−β(R +R∗ + T + T ∗)− dˆ)R∗ − kˆ(R∗ − aR),
dJ
dt
= σˆ(S − (αˆ(R +R∗) + δˆ)J),
dT
dt
= (ρI − β(R +R∗+T + T ∗)− d)T + k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) + Tinput,
dT ∗
dt
= (ρI − β(R +R∗+T + T ∗)− d)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗),
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗ − (α(R +R∗+T + T ∗) + δ)I). (4.1)
Parameters are deﬁned in Table 4.1. The model has components that have
been used in previous models, for instance cytokine dependent growth [18, 48],
cytokine kinetics [78], Fas-FasL mediated death [16], and positive feedback of T
cells on Tregs [42, 43], in [11] this is explicitly though IL-2.
The only important aspects of this model are a mechanism to sustain a po-
pulation of Tregs, secretion inhibition of T cells with a rate that correlates with
Treg population size, and growth and competition for IL-2 with a higher growth
rate of T cells relative to Tregs. Other aspects of the model can be altered with
only quantitative diﬀerences in behavior.
4.1.2 Dynamics of the model
To establish the model dynamics, in [11] it was initially simulated an inﬂux
of an autoimmune population of T cells into a tissue where the Tregs are at
homeostatic equilibrium. This could model adoptive transfer experiments where
there is no native circulation/production of these (foreign) T cells, i.e. Tinput = 0.
There are two possible outcomes depending on the strength of activation and
initial conditions: the autoimmune population is controlled with elimination of
autoimmune T cells and the Treg population reverting to an homeostatic state;
or the autoimmune population expands and escapes control. Escape can only
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Parameter Symbol Range Value
T cell T , T ∗
T cell Maximum growth rate1 ρ
‹
α < 6 day−1 4 day−1
Death rate of T cells d = dˆ 0.1-0.01 day−1 0.1 day−1
[50]
Capacity of T cells2 ρ
‹
(αβ) 106 − 107 cells/ml 107 cells/ml
[51]
Input rate Tinput 0− 104 cells/ml/day 0,100 cells/ml per day
Secretion reversion (constant)3 k hrs-days 0.1 hr−1
Antigen stimulation level bk 0.001-200 ×akˆ Bifurcation parameter
Tregs R, R∗
Growth rate ratio Treg :T  < 1 0.6
Homeostatic capacity Rhom (ρS/dˆ− δˆ)
‹
αˆ 10− 105 cells/ml 104 cells/ml
Relaxation rate kˆ hrs-days 0.1 hr−1
Death rate ratio Treg :T dˆ
‹
d 1
Treg antigen stimulation level akˆ 0-10 per day 1 per day
Secretion inhibition4 γ 0.1-100 ×R−1hom 10 R−1hom
Cytokines
Max. cytokine concentration5 1
‹
α 100-500 pM 200 pM
IL-2 secretion rate σ 6 0.07, 2 fgrms h−1 106 molecs s−1 cell−1
[79]
Relative adsorbance J to IL-2 σˆαˆ
‹
σα < 1 0.1
Relative secretion rate of J σˆ
‹
σ < 1 0.01
Cytokine decay rate σδ = σˆδˆ hrs-days 1.5 hr −1
[3]
1 Minimum duration of SG2M phase αρ−1 ≈ 3hrs.
2 Maximum T cell density for severe infections (based on LCMV).
3 This is in absence of Tregs.
4 This is in terms of the homeostatic Treg level Rhom which we set to 10
4 cells per ml.
5 This is taken as 20 times the receptor aﬃnity (10pM [46]).
6 Naive and memory cells respectively. This corresponds to 3000-105 molecules per h, IL-2 mass 15-18 kDa.
Table 4.1: Model parameters. Reproduced from [11].
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Figure 4.2: Time series plots for T cell populations on exposure to antigen
with various antigenicities b and Tinput = 0. Two initial conditions are
shown, low initial T cell load (solid), and high initial T cell load (dashed).
(A) Regulation, low b = 5 × 10−2; (B) Escape and control, intermediate
b = 0.5; (C) Escape, high b = 5000. Total Treg (red), immune T cells
(black). Reproduced from [11].
occur if the autoimmune antigenic stimulation b is above a threshold, denoted
bL. At low antigenic stimulation levels, autoimmune T cells are always eliminated
for all initial loads. However, even if stimulation is above bL escape requires the
initial load to be suﬃciently high. The dependence on T cell density is a quorum
mechanism, speciﬁcally if there is a suﬃciently high density of secreting T cells
cytokine levels are high enough for cell proliferation to exceed cell death. During
immune responses (escape of Treg control) the Treg population initially grows
in the IL-2 rich environment (bystander growth), but as the T cell population
saturates, by Fas-FasL apoptosis assumed in [11], the Treg population decays
because it is assumed susceptible to Fas-FasL apoptosis similar to conventional
T cells.
4.1.3 Bifurcation diagrams
These observations can be summarised in a plot of the equilibrium states. How-
ever above a critical antigenic load bL two new steady states emerge (only one of
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which is stable and thus realisable). To reach that state the initial load has to be
suﬃciently high, the load threshold lying on the basin of attraction of the escape
state with I = T = 0 and R,R∗ at their homeostatic densities. This threshold
is lowest for large b [11]. It gives the (necessary) minimum quorum size for es-
cape Tquorum and is approximated by the density T + T ∗ of the unstable steady
state. This dose dependence for proliferation is observed in transfer experiments.
Experimentally, suppression in vitro can be overcome at high levels of antigenic
stimulation [37]. This is observed here provided the initial density is higher than
Tquorum when there is a threshold in the antigenic stimulation level b at which
escape occurs. In the absence of Tregs the system shows identical bifurcation
behavior but the antigenic stimulation (bL) and quorum (Tquorum) thresholds are
lower. Thus Tregs shift the growth threshold to alter the balance in favour of inhi-
bition than immune responses. Therefore removal of Tregs (CD25+) in adoptive
transfer experiments lowers the threshold for immune responses, and autoimmune
populations that were previously suppressed in the presence of Tregs are then able
to escape. In normal healthy tissue a continuous inﬂux of autoimmune T cells is
expected, both from the thymus and through the circulation. This is modelled
as an inﬂux term Tinput > 0 to the T cell population. This has two signiﬁcant
eﬀects, ﬁrstly a non zero T cell population is sustained which means that es-
cape is easier, and secondly, above an antigenic stimulation threshold, denoted
bH , control is impossible (see Figure 4.3). This is because the inﬂux population
alone is suﬃcient to satisfy the quorum condition. Thus, in the bifurcation plot
(see Figure 4.3) a lower steady state equilibrium exists at low antigenic stimu-
lation (controlled state), but only the escape/immune response state exists at
high antigenic stimulation. At intermediate levels of antigenic stimulation b we
have two possible stable outcomes. The state that is attained depends on the
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Figure 4.3: Bifurcation plots with respect to the antigenic stimulation b of
T cells. Shown are two cases: Tregs present with R + R∗ red, T + T ∗
black, and no Tregs with T + T ∗ blue. Stable steady states are shown as
solid lines, unstable as dashed. Reproduced from [11].
initial conditions. So far it was assumed that levels of antigenic stimulation are
constant, however there are likely to be both ﬂuctuations and a slow variation
over time, eg during puberty. Thus, if antigenic stimulation rises above the thre-
shold bH in Figure 4.3, control is lost and autoimmunity arises. Note that even
if the antigenic stimulation level b falls to the original value, at which control
was originally achieved, control may not be reacquired, and is only attained if
stimulation falls below the second threshold bL in Figure 4.3. This phenomena,
termed hysteresis, is common in many physical and biological systems. The sys-
tem displays a control state and an immune state. This biphasic behavior is a
consequence of the IL-2 driven dynamics where the IL-2 concentration must be
high enough such that the growth rate exceeds the death rate. This requires a
suﬃciently high density of secreting T cells. Thus even in the absence of Tregs,
T cells can display this behavior (in fact in Figure 4.3 the parameters are such
that the bifurcation points bL, bH are lost and hysteresis is no longer observed
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although a sharp transition with b remains).
The presence of Tregs increases the thresholds bL, bH in Figure 4.3, thereby
enhancing the control state. The thresholds bL, bH can be tuned by adjusting the
Treg homeostatic population size with a larger size conferring greater protection.
We note that Tregs must be less eﬃcient at utilising IL-2 to proliferate, 
 < 1, eg
through a lower density of surface receptors (IL-2 receptor), otherwise escape is
impossible. Correspondingly, Tregs need a mechanism to sustain their numbers
such that Treg die out is prevented. An homeostatic mechanism (cytokine distinct
from IL-2) to maintain a local population is used. In this case conventional
T cells must be less eﬃcient at utilising this cytokine for growth than Tregs.
Alternatively, a continuous input Rinput can be used to maintain the population
(see Section 4.3). This asymmetry between Tregs and conventional T cells is
essential for the immune system to display both control and immune response
escape. Thus, at low inﬂammation levels, Treg survival is predominant, while at
high levels of pathogen load T cell growth is faster than Treg growth.
The bistability region vanishes when the thresholds bL and bH meet in a cusp
bifurcation. In the immune response model, this happens for low growth rates
of T cells and Tregs, for low values of the growth rate ratio between Tregs and
T cells, for low values of the secretion rate of cytokine J , and for high thymic
inputs.
4.1.4 Dynamics of cross-reactive proliferation
Humans are continuously exposed to pathogens which invoke T cell activation and
immune responses. This has consequences on Treg control of autoimmune states
since immune responses produce IL-2 and thus can lead to bystander growth and
loss of Treg homeostasis, or in the case of cross reactivity direct stimulation of
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auto reactive T cells.
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Figure 4.4: T cell cross reactivity between a pathogen and self. (A) Cross
reactive autoimmune T cells on pathogen infection can return to a controlled
state if antigenic stimulation from self (b = 0.1) is low; (B) For high b = 0.5
stimulation from self, an initially controlled autoimmune T cell clone escapes
when infection occurs with a cross reacting pathogen; (C) Identical to (B)
except infection interval is 7 days. A pathogen infection is modelled as a
step increase in b to 5000 for day 0-10 ((A) and (B)), 0-7 ((C)) to model
both the increase in antigen (cross reactive) and costimulation. Key: Red
solid R + R∗, Black dashed T + T ∗. Reproduced from [11].
It was simulated, in [11], a pathogen exposure in a tissue with initial Treg
control of an autoimmune population where there is cross reactivity between the
pathogen speciﬁc T cells and self. Depending on the strength of the autoimmune
antigen it was observed either a loss of control, i.e. Tregs fail to reacquire control,
or autoimmune suppression is reinstated post infection. The former case corres-
ponds to autoimmune antigenic stimulation levels bL < b < bH , although escape
is not guaranteed as the immune response must be of suﬃcient duration to allow
autoimmune T cells numbers to rise and suﬃciently outnumber Tregs (about 5.5
days in the simulations). Autoimmune T cells with b < bL are always controlled
post infection (see Figure 4.4 (A)). The length of the period post infection for
autoimmune control to be reestablished is determined by the slow death rate of
T cells. It was not included a speciﬁc downsizing mechanism or memory diﬀe-
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rentiation in the model which would reduce this period. Escape dynamics can
also show a delay in the onset of autoimmunity when infection duration is short
(see Figure 4.4 (C)). Cross reactivity enhances escape, however pure bystander
growth can also lead to escape although longer infection periods and higher b are
required for escape (see Subsection 4.3.4). Infections transiently enhance Treg
populations, either eventually returning to homeostasis, or in the case of autoim-
mune responses being themselves suppressed. In this model it is because of their
susceptibility to Fas-FasL mediated apoptosis. Other population saturation mo-
dels, speciﬁcally assumptions of the impact on Tregs of T cell saturation, can give
diﬀerent levels of Tregs.
4.2 Analysis of the model
The immune response model presented in [11] was studied in [12] with the re-
sults proven by us in [14]. We study the equilibria of the immune system in
a neighbourhood of the default values for the parameters and variables. The
concentration of T cells varies between a minimum value corresponding to the
homeostasis concentration of T cells Thom, i.e. when there is no antigenic stimu-
lation of T cells (b = 0), and a maximum value, the capacity of T cells Tcap, which
is obtained for high levels of antigenic stimulation of T cells (b = +∞). Using
Equation (4.29), the values Thom and Tcap are implicitly determined as zeros of a
polynomial. In particular, for the default values of the parameters, these values
are given by Thom = 9.6×102 cells per ml and Tcap = 9.7×106 cells per ml. When
the system is at equilibrium, we present, in Theorem 4.2.1 an explicit formula for
the relation between the concentration of T cells and the concentration of Tregs
for values of the concentration of T cells between Thom and Tcap (see Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: (A) The equilibria manifold for Thymic inputs Tinput ∈
[1, 10000]. Low values of b are darker and higher values are lighter; (B)
Cross section of the equilibria manifold for Tinput = 100. It illustrates The-
orem 4.2.1, showing the total concentration of Tregs y(x) = R + R∗ as a
function of the total concentration of T cells x = T + T ∗. The parameters
are at their default values.
Let Y1, Y2, Y3 be the following polynomials
Y1(x) = −αˆC(x)− βδˆB(x)
Y2(x) = 2αˆβB(x)
Y3(x) = Y 21 (x)− 2(δC(x)− 
ρSx)Y2(x) ,
where B(x) = (1− 
)x and C(x) = 
Tinput +B(x)(βx+ d).
Let X1, X2, X3 be the following polynomials
X1(y) = BC(y)D(y)− 
ρS
X2(y) = −2βBC(y)
X3(y) = X21 (y)− 2
TinputC(y)X2(y) ,
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where B = 1− 
 and C(y) = αˆy + δˆ, and D(y) = βy + d.
Let x = T + T ∗ be the total concentration of T cells and y = R +R∗ be the
total concentration of Tregs.
Theorem 4.2.1 When the system is at equilibrium, the concentration of Tregs
y = R +R∗ is given by the Treg curve
y(x) =
Y1(x) +
√
Y3(x)
Y2(x)
, (4.2)
where x = T + T ∗ is the total concentration of T cells. Conversely, the concen-
tration of T cells x(y) is determined by
x = X−(y) =
X1(y)−
√
X3(y)
X2(y)
or (4.3)
x = X+(y) =
X1(y) +
√
X3(y)
X2(y)
(4.4)
where y = R +R∗ is the total concentration of Tregs.
For simplicity of notation we write y(x) instead of y = Y (x). We also write x(y)
when either x = X−(y) or x = X+(y) should be used.
Proof: At equilibrium we have that:
σˆ(S − (αˆy + δˆ)J) = 0 , (4.5)
σ(T ∗ − (α(x+ y) + δ)I) = 0 (4.6)
(
ρ(I+J)−β(x+ y)− d)R + kˆ(R∗ − aR) = 0 , (4.7)
(
ρ(I+J)−β(x+ y)− d)R∗ − kˆ(R∗ − aR) = 0 , (4.8)
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(ρI − β(x+ y)− d)T + k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) + Tinput = 0 , (4.9)
(ρI − β(x+ y)− d)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) = 0. (4.10)
From (4.5), we get
J =
S
αˆy + δˆ
. (4.11)
From (4.6), we have
T ∗ = I(α(x+ y) + δ). (4.12)
Adding (4.7) and (4.8), we obtain

ρ(I + J)−β(x+ y)− d = 0 (4.13)
(or y = 0).
Subtracting (4.8) from (4.7), we get
(
ρ(I+J)−β(x+ y)− d)(R−R∗) + 2kˆ(R∗ − aR) = 0 . (4.14)
From (4.13) and (4.14), we have
R∗ = aR . (4.15)
Let A = a/(a+ 1). From (4.15), we get
R∗ = Ay . (4.16)
Adding (4.9) and (4.10), we obtain
ρI − β(x+ y)− d+ Tinput
x
= 0 (4.17)
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(or x = 0).
Subtracting (4.17) from (4.13), we get

ρJ − (1− 
)ρI − Tinput
x
= 0 . (4.18)
Subtracting (4.10) from (4.9), we have
(ρI − β(x+ y)− d)(T − T ∗) + 2k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) + Tinput = 0 . (4.19)
From (4.17) and (4.19), we have
T ∗(kx(1 + γR∗) + Tinput) = kxbT. (4.20)
From (4.20), we get
T ∗ =
kbx2
kx(1 + b+ γR∗) + Tinput
. (4.21)
From (4.16) and (4.21), we obtain
T ∗ =
kbx2
kx(1 + b+ γAy) + Tinput
. (4.22)
From (4.12) and (4.22), we get
I(α(x+ y) + δ) =
kbx2
kx(1 + b+ γAy) + Tinput
. (4.23)
Replacing (4.11) and (4.23) in (4.18), we have

ρS
αˆy + δˆ
− (1− 
)ρkbx
2
(α(x+ y) + δ)(kx(1 + b+ γAy) + Tinput)
− Tinput
x
= 0 . (4.24)
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Replacing (4.23) in (4.17), we obtain
ρkbx2
(α(x+ y) + δ)(kx(1 + b+ γAy) + Tinput)
− β(x+ y)− d+ Tinput
x
= 0 . (4.25)
From (4.25), we get
ρkb
(α(x+ y) + δ)(kx(1 + b+ γAy) + Tinput)
= β(x+ y) + d− Tinput
x
. (4.26)
Replacing (4.26) in (4.24), we have

ρS
αˆy + δˆ
− (1− 
)(β(x+ y) + d− Tinput
x
)− Tinput
x
= 0 . (4.27)
From (4.27), we obtain
x
ρS − (1− 
)(β(x+ y)x+ dx− Tinput)(αˆy + δˆ)− Tinput(αˆy + δˆ) = 0 , (4.28)
which, solving (4.28) for y and considering only the positive root, proves equality
(4.2).

The maximum concentration Rmax of Tregs is a zero of a fourth order poly-
nomial and, so, Rmax has an explicit solution. In particular, for the default
values of the parameters, the maximum concentration Rmax of Tregs is given by
Rmax = 2.1× 104 cells per ml, and the corresponding concentration of T cells is
1.9× 104 cells per ml. The minimum concentration Rmin of Tregs is 156 cells per
ml, and the corresponding concentration of T cells is given by Tcap = 9.7 × 106
cells per ml.
When the system is at equilibrium, we obtain the level of the antigenic stimu-
lation b(x, y(x)) of T cells from the concentration x of T cells, using the auxiliary
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Treg curve y(x) computed in Theorem 4.2.1 (see Figure 4.6). The antigen fun-
ction b(x, y) is given by
b(x, y) =
ϕ(x, y)(kx(1 + γAy) + Tinput)
k(1− 
)ρx3(αˆy + δˆ)− kxϕ(x, y) , (4.29)
where A = a/(1 + a) and ϕ(x, y) = (
ρSx− Tinput(αˆy + δˆ))(α(x+ y) + δ).
Theorem 4.2.2 Let b(x, y) be the antigen function, and let x(y) and y(x) be
as in Theorem 4.2.1. The level of the antigenic stimulation of T cells is given
by b(x, y(x)), or, equivalently, by b(x(y), y), when the system is at equilibrium
(stable or unstable). Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level b of T cells,
the concentration x of T cells and the concentration y of Tregs are zeros of the
twelfth order polynomials that can be explicitly constructed.
Proof: From (4.18), we have
I(1− 
)ρx = J
ρx− Tinput . (4.30)
Replacing (4.11) in (4.30), we get
I =

ρSx− Tinput(αˆy + δˆ)
(1− 
)ρx(αˆy + δˆ) . (4.31)
Replacing (4.31) in (4.23), we obtain
(
ρSx− Tinput(αˆy + δˆ))(α(x+ y) + δ) = (1− 
)ρkbx
3(αˆy + δˆ)
kx(1 + b+ γAy) + Tinput
. (4.32)
Hence, solving (4.32) for b, we prove equality (4.29).

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Figure 4.6: The hysteresis of the equilibria manifold for Thymic inputs
Tinput ∈ [1, 10000], with the other parameters at their default values. These
ﬁgures show the relation between the antigenic stimulation level b, the con-
centration of T cells x = T +T ∗, and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗.
The hysteresis unfolds for high values of the parameter Tinput. (A) Low va-
lues of y = R+R∗ are darker and higher values are lighter; (B) Low values
of x = T + T ∗ are darker and higher values are lighter; (C) Cross section
of the equilibria manifold for Tinput = 100, illustrating Theorem 4.2.2, with
the concentration of T cells x (black solid line) and the concentration of
Tregs y (redred dashes); (D) Cross section of the equilibria manifold for
Tinput = 100, illustrating Theorem 4.2.3, with the concentration of T cells
x (blueblue dashes) for the simpliﬁed model without Tregs. We also show
the concentration of T cells x (black solid line) from Theorem 4.2.2.
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In Theorem 4.2.3, we obtain the level of the antigenic stimulation of T cells
from the concentration x of T cells, for the simpliﬁed model without Tregs. The
antigen function b˜(x) in the absence of Tregs is given by
b˜(x) =
(αx+ δ)(kx+ Tinput)(βx2 + dx− Tinput)
kx(ρx2 + (Tinput − βx2 − dx)(αx+ δ)) . (4.33)
Theorem 4.2.3 Let us consider the simpliﬁed model with the concentration of
Tregs equal to zero (i.e. y = 0). The level of the antigenic stimulation of T cells is
given by b˜(x), when the system is at equilibrium (stable or unstable). Conversely,
given an antigenic stimulation level b, the concentration x of T cells is a zero of
the fourth order polynomial that can be explicitly constructed.
Proof: At equilibrium we have that:
σ(T ∗ − αx+ δ)I) = 0 , (4.34)
(ρI − βx− d)T + k(T ∗ − bT ) + Tinput = 0 , (4.35)
(ρI − βx− d)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT ) = 0 . (4.36)
From (4.34), we have
T ∗ = I(αx+ δ) . (4.37)
Adding (4.35) and (4.36), we obtain
ρI − βx− d+ Tinput
x
= 0 (4.38)
(or x = 0)
Subtracting (4.36) from (4.35), we have
(ρI − βx− d)(T − T ∗) + 2k(T ∗ − bT ) + Tinput = 0 . (4.39)
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From (4.38) and (4.39), we have
T ∗(kx+ Tinput) = kxbT . (4.40)
From (4.40), we obtain
T ∗ =
kbx2
kx(1 + b) + Tinput
. (4.41)
From (4.37) and (4.41), we get
I(αx+ δ) =
kbx2
kx(1 + b) + Tinput
. (4.42)
From (4.17), we have
I =
βx2 + dx− Tinput
ρx
. (4.43)
Finally, from (4.42) and (4.43), we get
b˜(x) =
(αx+ δ)(kx+ Tinput)(βx2 + dx− Tinput)
kx(ρx2 + (Tinput − βx2 − dx)(αx+ δ)) . (4.44)

When the system is at equilibrium, the threshold values of antigen stimulation
bL and bH of T cells are determined using zeros of a polynomial. The antigen
threshold function V (x, y, z) is equal to V6(y, z)x6 + · · · + V0(y, z), where the
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functions V0(y, z), ..., V6(y, z) are given by the polynomials
V0(y, z) = kC2F 2T 3input
V1(y, z) = 2kCFT 2inputH
V2(y, z) = kTinput(H2 + CFTinput(3ρCE − γACFkz − 2αG))
V3(y, z) = kTinput(2FG(αG− ρCE + γBCFkz) + 2ρCEFk(1 + γAy)
−αCTinput(2γAFkz + ρEz − 2ρE + 2αG))
V4(y, z) = k(C(−G(ρE(αTinput(1− z) + kF (1 + γAy))− 4kzαγAFTinput)
−kCTinput(αρE(z − 1)(1 + γAy) + zγA(ρEF + α2Tinput)))
+G(−kzγBF 2G+ α2GTinput − ρzαˆEFTinput))
V5(y, z) = ρGk(γBFk(δˆρE − 2αG) + ρE(kαC(1 + γAy)− kαˆF − ααˆTinput))z
V6(y, z) = αGk2(−αγAG+ Eρ(γδˆA− αˆ))z ,
where A = a/(1 + a), B = βδ − αd, C(y) = αˆy + δˆ, D(y) = βy + d, E = 1 − 
,
F (y) = αy + δ, G = 
ρS and H(y) = αC(y)Tinput − F (y)G.
Theorem 4.2.4 When the system is at equilibrium, a threshold of the antigenic
stimulation bM of T cells exists, if, and only if, there is a zero xM ∈ [Thom, Tcap]
of the antigen threshold function V (x, y(x), y′(x)). This zero is such that bM =
b(xM , y(xM )), where M ∈ {L,H}. The equality V (x, y(x), y′(x)) = 0 is equiva-
lent to V˜ (x) = 0, where V˜ (x) is a polynomial that can be explicitly constructed.
Proof: By equality (4.29), we have that b(x, y) = N(x, y)/D(x, y), where N and
D are the following cubic polynomials in x and y
N(x, y) = (
ρSx− Tinput(αˆy + δˆ))(α(x+ y) + δ)(kx(1 + γAy) + Tinput)
D(x, y) = k(1− 
)ρx3(αˆy + δˆ)− kx(
ρSx− Tinput(αˆy + δˆ))(α(x+ y) + δ) .
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If Tinput > 0, the points xL and xH exist if, and only if, the function db(x, y(x))/dx
have two distinct positive zeros. The values xL and xH are these zeros. If
Tinput = 0, the point xL exists if, and only if, the function db(x, y(x))/dx has one
positive zero. Furthermore, xL is such zero. From equation (4.29), we have that
b(x, y) = N(x, y)/D(x, y), with N(x, y) and D(x, y) cubic polynomials in x and
y. Hence, db(x, y(x))/dx is equal to V (x, y(x), y′(x)) where
V (x, y, z) =
∂N(x, y)
∂x
D(x, y)−N(x, y)∂D(x, y)
∂x
+
(
∂N(x, y)
∂y
D(x, y)−N(x, y)∂D(x, y)
∂y
)
z .
Since
∂N(x, y(x))
∂x
= 
ρSVW + αUV + kUW (1 + γAy)
∂N(x, y(x))
∂y
= −αˆV WTinput + αUV + kxγAUW
∂D(x, y(x))
∂x
= −kUW − kx
ρSW − kxαU + 3kρ(1− 
)(αˆy + δˆ)x2
∂D(x, y(x))
∂y
= kxαˆWTinput − kxαU + kαˆρ(1− 
)x3 .
where U(x, y) = 
ρSx − Tinput(αˆy + δˆ), V (x, y) = kx(1 + γAy) + Tinput and
W (x, y) = α(x + y) + δ, we get that the expression V (x, y, z) for the antigen
threshold function follows.

For the parameters that unfold the hysteresis, the antigenic thresholds bL and
bH form a cusp. The cusp bifurcation at the antigenic stimulation bC of T cells
is an origin of the unfold of the hysteresis, with respect to a parameter, and, so,
biologically relevant. The concentration xC of T cells corresponding to levels of
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the antigenic stimulation bC = b(xC , y(xC)) satisﬁes the following equalities
V (x, y(x), y′(x)) = 0 and
W (x, y(x), y′(x), y′′(x)) = 0 , (4.45)
where
W (x, y, z, v) =
n∑
i=1
Vi(y, z)
xi−1
i
+
n∑
i=0
∂Vi(y, z)
∂y
xiz +
∂Vi(y, z)
∂z
xiv .
In Figure 4.7, the antigenic thresholds bH and bL and the ratio bH/bL decrease
with Tinput. The cusp bC occurs at Tinput ≈ 650 cells per ml, unfolding the hys-
teresis. When Tinput gets close to the value 10.34 cells per ml the threshold bH
tends to inﬁnity. The concentration x(bL) of T cells decreases and the concen-
tration x(bH) of T cells increases with Tinput. The concentration y(bL) of Tregs
increases with Tinput and the concentration y(bH) of Tregs has a maxima for
Tinput ≈ 500 cells per ml.
4.3 Asymmetry in the immune response model
In [13] we introduce an asymmetry reﬂecting that the diﬀerence between the
growth and death rates can be higher for the active T cells and the active Tregs
than for the inactive T cells and inactive Tregs. This asymmetry can be explained
by the eﬀect of memory T cells. The memory T cells last longer than the other
T cells and react more promptly to their speciﬁc antigen [64]. This results in a
positive correlation between the antigenic stimulation and the diﬀerence between
growth rate and the death rate of T cells.
This asymmetry brings up the relevance of the antigenic stimulation of Tregs
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Figure 4.7: Dependence of the thresholds with the Thymic input parameter
Tinput ∈ [1, 650] with the other parameters at their default values. The
model with Tregs is with bold lines and the simpliﬁed model without Tregs
is with dotted lines. (A) The thresholds of the antigenic stimulation bL
(dark blue) and bH (light green); (B) The concentration x(bL) (dark blue)
of T cells and the concentration x(bH) (light green) of T cells; (C) The
concentration y(bL) (dark blue) of Tregs and the concentration y(bH) (light
green) of Tregs.
in the control of the local Treg population size. Hence, under homeostasis, a larger
antigenic stimulation of Tregs results in a larger Treg population size. Further-
more, there is a positive correlation between the antigenic stimulation of Tregs
and the thresholds bL and bH of antigenic stimulation of T cells. Hence, organs
with diﬀerent antigenic stimulation of Tregs have diﬀerent levels of protection
against the development of an immune response by T cells, under the presence
of their speciﬁc antigen.
We study the eﬀect of a positive correlation between the antigenic stimulation
of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of Tregs, due to the antigen presenting
cells (APC), such as dendritic cells, present both self antigens and foreign antigens
[42, 43]. Here, with a structurally diﬀerent model, we attain the same conclu-
sions, as in [44], due to the asymmetry in the diﬀerence between the growth and
death rates. We ﬁnd, for some parameter values, that slow rates of increase of
150 Immune Response Models
the antigenic stimuli do not lead to an immune response, but fast rates of in-
crease of the antigenic stimuli can trigger an immune response. This behavior is
mathematically explained by the presence of a transcritical bifurcation.
4.3.1 The model
The model proposed consists of a set of ordinary diﬀerential equations similar to
the one presented in [11], with a compartment for each T cell population (inactive
Tregs R, active Tregs R∗, non secreting T cells T , secreting activated T cells T ∗)
and interleukine 2 density I:
dR
dt
= (
ρI−β(R +R∗ + T + T ∗)− dR)R + kˆ(R∗ − aR) +Rinput,
dR∗
dt
= (
ρI−β(R +R∗ + T + T ∗)− dR∗)R∗ − kˆ(R∗ − aR),
dT
dt
= (ρI − β(R +R∗+T + T ∗)− dT )T + k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) + Tinput,
dT ∗
dt
= (ρI − β(R +R∗+T + T ∗)− dT ∗)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗),
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗ − (α(R +R∗+T + T ∗) + δ)I).
The parameters range are as in Table 4.1. The new parameters considered here
are Rinput = Tinput = 100 cells/ml/day which gives a homeostatic concentration
Rhom of Tregs of 1.36 × 103 cells/ml in the absence of antigenic stimulation of
T cells (b = 0). And the parameters for the asymmetry in the death rates
dR = dT = 0.1 per day, dR∗ = dT ∗ = 0.01 per day. The new aspect of this model,
comparing with the model presented in Section 4.1.1, is the asymmetry in the
diﬀerence between the growth and death rates.
With this kind of asymmetry present for the T cells, the increase of the
population of T cells with the increase of the antigenic stimulation b of T cells is
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caused both by the increase in cytokine secretion (similarly to the model presented
in Section 4.1.1) and by the decrease in the average death rate of T cells. Hence,
there is an improvement in the eﬃciency of the response of the immune system
for high antigenic stimulations (high values of the parameter b).
In the case of the cross reactive direct stimulation, the results obtained with
this model are similar to the ones presented in the Subsection 4.1.4. However,
when a bystander proliferation is considered, higher death rate of the non secre-
ting T cells provokes lower concentrations of the bystander T cells, thus improving
the results obtained (see [15]). In [13] we study the eﬀects of diﬀerent tunings
between the antigenic stimulation a of Tregs and the antigenic stimulation b of
T cells, by considering (for simplicity) a linear relation between a and b, eg due
to an increase in the number of antigen presenting cells. The protection of the
tissues against autoimmunity is enhanced by this relation between the stimuli a
and b since both antigenic thresholds bL and bH increase. This positive correla-
tion between the stimulation of T cells and the stimulation of Tregs resembles
some features of a diﬀerent model [44] and, as in their case, we show, in the
presence of the asymmetry of the death rates, that the time rate of variation of
stimulation of the immune system can determine the presence or absence of an
immune response. We ﬁnd that for some tuning between the antigenic stimula-
tion a of Tregs and the antigenic stimulation b of T cells, a high rate of variation
of the stimulation provokes an immune response, contrasting with a low rate of
variation of the stimulation which does not provoke an immune response. A ma-
thematical explanation for the fact that fast and slow variations of the antigenic
stimulation result in diﬀerent outcomes is that for a given tuning and a given
antigenic stimulation b of T cells we are in the presence of a transcritic bifurca-
tion. Small perturbations of the tuning can bring the unfold of the transcritic
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bifurcation allowing the appearance of immune responses bursts for much lower
values of the antigenic stimulation of T cells than before the unfolding. The pe-
riod of time necessary for the appearance of the burst depends on the size of the
perturbations.
4.3.2 Bifurcation diagrams
We study the positive correlation between the antigenic stimulation a of Tregs
and the the antigenic stimulation b of T cells. Since both are presented by the
antigen presenting cells (APC). For simplicity, we study a linear relation between
these stimuli in the form: a = a0+mb. If the the levels of antigenic stimulation a
of the Tregs and the levels of antigen stimulation b of the T cells are independent,
i.e. the slope m is equal to zero, an hysteresis is present regardless of the value
of the antigenic stimulation a of the Tregs. The two antigenic thresholds bL and
bH bound the bistability region of the hysteresis. We observe that the thresholds
bL and bH of antigenic stimulation of T cells and the ratio bH/bL increase with
the antigenic stimulation a of the Tregs. Similarly to the case when the antigenic
stimulation a of the Tregs is independent of the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
(see Figure 4.8 (A)), an hysteresis is present for small values 0 ≤ m < mS of the
slope m. We observe, when m = mS , the appearance of a saddle-node bifurcation
point, disconnected from the hysteresis (see Figure 4.8 (B)). For values of the slope
mS < m < mX , a loop is present, disconnected from the hysteresis (see Figures
4.8 (C) and (D)). When m = mX , a transcritical bifurcation appears when the
loop touches the hysteresis at the threshold bH of the hysteresis (see Figure 4.8
(E)). For values of m > mX the loop merges with the hysteresis, corresponding
to a system with a wider hysteresis (see Figure 4.8 (F)).
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Figure 4.8: Equilibria for diﬀerent tunings a = a0 + mb of the antigenic
stimulations, with a0 = 1/2.4. From A to F the slope m increases. Black
lines: concentration of T cells, Red lines: concentration of Tregs. Solid
lines indicate stable equilibria and dashed lines indicate unstable equilibria.
(A) (m = 0) we see the hysteresis similar to the one observed in [11]; (B)
(m = 0.164428) we see the appearance of a saddle node point; (C) (m =
0.165) the point increases to a loop limited by two folds; (D) (m = 1) the
loop is bigger; (E) (m = 1.64298) the loop touches the hysteresis threshold
bH in a transcritical bifurcation; (F) (m = 2) the loop has merged with
the hysteresis. Further increases of the slope will not make qualitative
diﬀerences in the ﬁgure.
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If we consider that in the “normal” state of the immune system there is a
positive correlation between the antigen thresholds a and b as in Figure 4.8 (F),
the slope m can be related to autoimmunity, since a reduction of the slope will
decrease the antigenic threshold bH of T cells. In particular when the slope
m = mX there is a discontinuity in bH with slopes below mX creating thresholds
bH 400 times lower than the thresholds bH for slopes above mX .
4.3.3 Fast and slow variation of antigenic stimulation
The antigenic stimulation of T cells and Tregs is likely to change with time
either rapidly, eg due to an infection with the consequent immune response as an
outcome, or slowly, caused by the natural modiﬁcations of the organism with age
and with the T cells being kept in control by the Tregs. We model these situations
by considering that the antigenic stimulation b of T cells varies between b0 < bL
and b∞ > bH in an interval of time. To compute the value of b, we choose the
following log-sigmoid function of time:
log b(t) = log b0 +
log b∞ − log b0
1 + e−(t−tM )/τ
,
with b0 = 0.01, b∞ = 10 and tM = 100. This function passes through the median
b =
√
b0b∞ = 0.316 . . . at a time tM = 100 days. The derivative of this function
is inversely proportional to the parameter τ , meaning that the steepness factor τ
is related to the typical time of increase of b, with higher values of the steepness
factor τ being related to slow variations of b. We also consider that the antigen
stimulation a of Tregs varies with the antigen stimulation b of T cells in the linear
relation: a(b) = a0 +mb, with a0 = 1/2.4 and slope m = 2, as in Figure 4.8 (F).
In the model with asymmetric death rates with a slope m above the value of
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Figure 4.9: Eﬀect of diﬀerent rates of increase of b. The level of antigenic
stimulation b of T cells varies between 0.01 and 10 in a log-sigmoid function
of time with steepness factor τ . The antigenic stimulation a of Tregs is
a(b) = 1/2.4 + 2b. Black dashes: total concentration of T cells (T + T ∗)
Red line: total concentration of Tregs (R + R∗). Blue dash-dots: antigenic
stimulation b of T cells (presented as b/100 to ﬁt in the window). Vertical
grey dots: median time of the variation (100 days). (A) Fast variations
of the antigenic stimulation (τ = 10 days) give an immune response; (B)
For slow variations of the antigenic stimulation (τ = 100 days) the T cells
remain controlled. For intermediate rates of variation either there is an
immune response ((C) τ = 28 days) or a controlled state ((D) τ = 29
days).
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the transcritical bifurcation m > mX = 1.64 . . ., we observe that a fast variation
of the antigenic stimulation triggers an immune response (see Figure 4.9 (A)),
i.e. the concentration T + T ∗ of T cells is high, near the capacity value Tcap,
with a transient increase in the concentration R + R∗ of Tregs. On the other
hand, in a slow variation of the antigenic stimulation (see Figure 4.9 (B)), the
concentration T + T ∗ of T cells has a temporary small increase and the increase
in the concentration R + R∗ of Tregs is able to sustain a controlled state, thus
resulting in a subclinical behaviour that enhances the protection of the tissue
against autoimmunity. We observe that there is a threshold value of the steepness
factor (τ0 ≈ 28.5 days) such that an immune response arises for lower values of
the steepness factor and that a controlled state is maintained for higher steepness
factors (see Figures 4.9 (C) and (D)).
4.3.4 Dynamics of bystander proliferation
The asymmetry maintains the basic features of the model, namely, the existence
of a controlled stable steady state (with low concentration of T cells) and the
existence of an immune response stable steady state (with high concentration
of T cells), depending on the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the initial
conditions. The thresholds bL and bH of antigenic stimulation of T cells, are
similar to the ones presented in Subsection 4.1.2.
The simulations of the bystander proliferation have diﬀerences between the
immune response model and the model presented in this Section. In the simula-
tions of a bystander proliferation, we considered two lines of T cells Tb, T ∗b and
Tc, T ∗c that have, respectively, pathogen stimulation b and autoimmune antigen
stimulation c. We study this model considering two cases: a) the symmetric
case, as in [11]; b) the asymmetric case, as in [13]. The model consists of a set of
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ordinary diﬀerential equations (see [11, 13] for further details) and is employed
to study the dynamics, with a compartment for each T cell population (inactive
Tregs R, active Tregs R∗, non secreting T cells Tb and Tc, secreting activated T
cells T ∗b and T
∗
c ) and interleukine 2 density I:
dR
dt
= (
ρI − βN − dR)R + kˆ(R∗ − aR) +Rinput,
dR∗
dt
= (
ρI − βN − dR∗)R∗ − kˆ(R∗ − aR),
dTb
dt
= (ρI − βN − dT )Tb + k(T ∗b − bTb+γR∗T ∗b ) + Tinput,
dT ∗b
dt
= (ρI − βN − dT ∗)T ∗b − k(T ∗b − bTb+γR∗T ∗b ),
dTc
dt
= (ρI − βN − dT )Tc + k(T ∗c − bTc+γR∗T ∗c ) + Tinput,
dT ∗c
dt
= (ρI − βN − dT ∗)T ∗c − k(T ∗c − bTc+γR∗T ∗c ),
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗b + T
∗
c − (αN + δ)I).
with N = R + R∗ + Tb + T ∗b + Tc + T
∗
c . We chose the following values for
the parameters Rinput = Tinput = 100 cells/ml/day, dR = dT = 0.1 per day,
dR∗ = dT ∗ = 0.01 or 0.1 per day and the values of the other parameters are equal
to the ones presented in Table 4.1. The important aspects of this model are a
mechanism to sustain a population of Tregs, secretion inhibition of T cells with
a rate that correlates with Treg population size, and growth and competition for
IL-2 with a higher growth rate of T cells relative to Tregs.
We compare the dynamics of the bystander proliferation between the model
with symmetric death rates and the model with asymmetric death rates. The
asymmetry reﬂects that the diﬀerence between the growth and death rates can be
higher for the active T cells and the active Tregs than for the inactive T cells and
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inactive Tregs. The asymmetry in the diﬀerence between the growth and death
rates brings up the relevance of the antigenic stimulation of Tregs in the control
of the local Treg population size. This asymmetry can be due to the presence of
memory T cells and memory regulatory T cells. We observe that the asymmetry
in the model provokes slightly faster growth rate of T cells, in particular for high
antigenic stimulations b of T cells due to the lower average death rate of T cells.
In the case of the cross reactive direct stimulation, the results are analogous
to the immune response model [11]: the ﬁnal state of the model is either a
controlled state or an immune response state, the last one being achieved if the
stimulation of the autoimmune antigen b is between bL and bH and the duration of
the immune response is of suﬃcient duration (about 5 days in the simulations in
[11]). The simulations of the bystander proliferation present diﬀerences between
the symmetric case and the asymmetric case. In our simulations, we consider
a tissue with initial controlled state of both T cells lines and we simulate a
pathogen infection as a step increase in b from 0 to 1000 between days 0 and
7 (other choices of suitable pathogen dynamics give analogous results). If the
autoimmune stimulation of T cells was too low (c < cL) the autoimmune T cells
could not sustain autoimmunity after pathogen clearance and Tregs would be
able to regain control. On the other hand, if the autoimmune stimulation of T
cells was too high (c > cH) it would be impossible to have an initial controlled
autoimmune state. In the simulations in Figure 4.10, we choose the autoimmune
antigenic stimulation c = 0.1 to be a constant value between the thresholds cL
and cH of antigen stimulation. In the three simulations presented in Figure 4.10,
we observe that the concentrations of the autoimmune line of T cells Tc, T ∗c
increases between days 0 and 7, because, during this period of time, there is an
increase of the concentration of I cytokine secreted by the line of T cells Tb, T ∗b
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that respond to the pathogen. There is also a transient increase in the population
of Tregs due to the I cytokine followed by suppression of Tregs due to the Fas-
FasL mediated apoptosis. In the end of the pathogen exposure (after 7 days)
the secreting autoimmune T cells T ∗c generate enough I cytokine to sustain the
population of autoimmune T cells Tc, T ∗c in high concentrations, thus developing
an autoimmune response.
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Figure 4.10: Bystander proliferation for diﬀerent models. (A) The symme-
tric case: the T cells not responding to the pathogen have equal concen-
tration to the T cells responding to the pathogen; (B) Only the secreting
T cells T ∗ die slower: the T cells not responding to the pathogen have
lower concentration than the T cells responding to the pathogen; (C) The
asymmetric case: the T cells not responding to the pathogen have lower con-
centration than the T cells responding to the pathogen and take more time
than in case B to achieve an immune response. Black dots: concentration of
T cells responding to the pathogen (Tb + T
∗
b ); Green dashes: concentration
of T cells not responding to the pathogen (Tc+T
∗
c ); Red line: concentration
of Tregs (R + R∗).
The onset of autoimmunity depends both of the duration of the pathogen
exposure and of the model considered. In the symmetric case with two lines of T
cells (with dR∗ = dT ∗ = 0.1 per day), we observe that the autoimmune response
stabilizes around 10 weeks after the pathogen exposure (see Figure 4.10 (A)). In
the asymmetric case, with lower death rate of secreting T cells and active Tregs
(dR∗ = dT ∗ = 0.01 per day), the autoimmunity arises approximately 8 weeks after
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the pathogen exposure (see Figure 4.10 (C)). We also consider an intermediate
choice of death rates (see Figure 4.10 (B)), where the asymmetry of the death
rates is present only for the T cells (dR∗ = 0.1 per day and dT ∗ = 0.01 per
day). In this case, the autoimmunity appears after about 6 weeks.The comparison
of the Tregs concentrations, presented in Figures 4.10 (B) and (C), show that
the asymmetry in the growth and death rates between the active and inactive
regulatory T cells have implications in the concentration of the regulatory T
cells after the pathogen removal. As we can see, in Figures 4.10 (B) and (C), the
concentration of the regulatory T cells is higher in the presence of the asymmetry.
In the case of an autoimmune response of T cells Tc, T ∗c , we observed that the
concentration of both lines of T cells are always equal in the symmetric case
where Tb +T ∗b = Tc +T
∗
c (see Figure 4.10 (A)), because the growth rates and the
death rates of the two types of T cells are equal. However, in the asymmetric case
(see Figure 4.10 (C)), the line of T cells Tb, T ∗b that responds to the pathogen
stimulation b has higher concentration than the other line of T cells Tc, T ∗c during
the infection period (between 0 and 7 days). This is due to the lower average
death rate of the line of T cells that respond to the pathogen Tb, T ∗b . For the same
reason, when we consider the asymmetry of the death rates only for the T cells
(see Figure 4.10 (B)), the concentration of the line of T cells Tb, T ∗b that responds
to the pathogen is also higher than the other concentration of the other line of T
cells Tc, T ∗c during the infection period. After the infection period, the T cells Tb,
T ∗b decrease to the initial homeostatic levels. However, the autoimmune response
for the T cells Tc, T ∗c appear because the antigenic stimulation c is between cL
and cH and, also, because the IL-2 cytokine concentration is high enough to move
their state, through the hysteresis unstable manifold, to the basin of attraction
of the autoimmune response equilibrium state.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we examined mechanisms of Treg control of immune responses
through regulation of cytokine dependent T cell proliferation. In the model in
[11], Tregs have two eﬀects on cytokine levels: ﬁrstly they directly inhibit cy-
tokine secretion; and secondly they adsorb (and thus compete for) proliferative
cytokines. Both of these have an impact on T cell growth. Secretion inhibition
is shown to act as a growth modulator through adjustment of a quorum thre-
shold associated with cytokine growth dynamics. The second eﬀect was minimal
in the simulations because the Treg population was always a minor population.
However, increasing the homeostatic level of Tregs would increase the impact of
this competition and reduce immune response growth rates, thereby extending
immune response times.
The threshold mechanism discussed here is extremely robust to model de-
tails, being eﬀectively a model of activation and escape. Proliferation driven
by a secreted cytokine is naturally population size (quorum) dependent [18] and
“quorum sensing” imposes a population consensus on immune responses which
are only initiated if a suﬃciently high number of T cells are locally activated. A
locally maintained population of Tregs raise this quorum threshold in the local tis-
sue. Thus, immune responses are inhibited unless the number of activated T cells
is suﬃciently large when the immune response escapes inhibition; such escape is
dependent on the higher eﬃciency with which conventional T cells (responders)
can utilise IL-2 compared to Tregs.
The bistability presented here is, in fact, a common feature of all the current
Treg models [42]. To retain a control Treg population we had to include an
homeostatic mechanism such as a J cytokine or an input ﬂux Rinput (as in Section
4.3), eg from the thymus.
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Treg induced secretion inhibition can protect diﬀerent tissues from immune
responses to varying degrees, by adjusting (possibly through evolutionary sele-
ction) the size and activity of the local Treg population. In Section 4.3, when
we considered an asymmetry in the death rates, the size and activity of the local
Treg population are controlled by the antigenic stimulation a of Tregs, by the
inﬂow Rinput of Tregs and by the asymmetry in the death rates of Tregs. Fur-
thermore, the asymmetry in the death rates of T cells, caused for example by the
presence of memory cells, is an improvement to the model, since high antigenic
stimulations b of T cells provoke a faster increase of the concentration of T cells in
the modiﬁed model. These mechanisms allow tissues that are frequently exposed
to antigen, eg the gut, to have the balance more in favour of inhibition, while
other tissues may have no local Treg population. Under pathogen invasion Treg
control can be broken and an immune response ensue. After pathogen clearance,
T cells downsize and diﬀerentiate to memory whilst Tregs ideally return to pre
immune response levels through homeostatic regulation. However, since regula-
tion is non speciﬁc, an immune response, and the associated proliferative cytokine
production can induce bystander proliferation of autoimmune T cells (and Tregs),
whilst enhanced levels of costimulation can abrogate inhibition which undermines
control of autoimmunity. The existence of an asymmetry in the death rates of T
cells is an improvement of the immune response model in the simulation of the
bystander proliferation because it allows the T cells stimulated by the pathogen
to have higher concentrations than the other lines of T cells. Because of the hys-
teresis implicit in the dynamics, the high proliferation of these bystanders during
the immune response may lead to their escape from Treg control and thereby
establish chronic autoimmunity.
We also considered (see [13]) that the antigenic stimulation a of Tregs is pos-
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itively correlated to the antigenic stimulation b of T cells. When we considered
a linear relation a = a0 + mb, between the antigenic stimulations a and b, we
observed a transcritical bifurcation at a slope m = mX that can be related to
the appearance of autoimmunity at low self antigenic stimulation b of T cells for
lower slopes m < mX . For higher slopes m > mX , we can still see a partial
eﬀect, dependent of the rate of increase of the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
with results similar to other authors [44] in a structurally diﬀerent model. We
observed that for slow increases of the antigenic stimulation b the Tregs are able
to maintain control but for fast increases of b an immune response is triggered.
Thus our model can explain the fact that autoimmunity can be associated with
a prior pathogen exposure. Whilst bystander proliferation could lead to autoim-
munity we found that cross reacting T cells were more prone to escape (escape at
lower b). The load threshold behavior observed in adoptive transfer experiments
[69] is also explained by this quorum growth mechanism, whilst we predict a cy-
tokine (principally IL-2) dependence of this threshold and thus its modulation
under alteration of the IL-2 environment. The reverse switch from autoimmune
to controlled state can be achieved if the autoimmune T cell population can be
lowered suﬃciently, or Treg density increased. For example, immune suppression
that targets conventional T cells but not Tregs could lead to a switch. A possible
target is suppression of IL-2 secretion, provided chronic autoimmune states are
IL-2 dependent. However, because of the hysteresis in this system high levels of
suppression are needed, whilst the observation of delayed escape and autoimmu-
nity indicates that temporal dynamics must also be considered.
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